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Current History

OCTOBER, 1959

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American Foreign Policy and the Communist World

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Coming next month...

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WESTERN WORLD

November, 1959

Our November issue will complement this month's study with an analysis of the effect of the continuing cold war on Russian foreign policy. Articles will include:

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE COLD WAR by *Hans Morgenthau*, Director, Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago;

SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE COLD WAR by *Michael T. Florinsky*, Professor of Economics, Columbia University;

RUSSIAN BELIEF IN WORLD COMMUNISM AND ITS EVENTUAL VICTORY by *Julian Towner*, Professor of Political Science, University of California;

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RUSSIA AND HER CHINESE PARTNER by *Peter S. H. Tang*, Executive Director of the Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Inc.

COMING SOON . . .

COMMUNIST CHINA AS A WORLD POWER, December, 1959

WEST GERMANY AS A WORLD POWER, January, 1960

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Current History

Vol. 37

OCTOBER, 1959

No. 218

The October issue of CURRENT HISTORY is devoted to an analysis of the 15-year old East-West conflict as it is reflected in United States foreign policy. Has cold war policy hindered our relations with the Soviet Union and its allies? In summing up the West's "contest with Communism," Hans Kohn, in our introductory article, emphasizes that the cold war "... forces the West not only into greater unity, into growing beyond the confines of the nation-state, but also into an awareness of its own principles of liberty for all and an earnest effort to apply them."

United States Policy in the Cold War

By HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

FOR THE LAST twelve years United States foreign policy has largely been dominated by the fact and concept of the cold war. Three great initiatives that fundamentally changed United States foreign policy were taken under the impact of the Cold War—the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the resistance to Communist aggression in Korea. Each one of them implied a fundamental deviation from traditional American foreign policy. None could have been foreseen 20 years ago. They were the result of the completely changed framework of international relations as it emerged from World War II.

Yet the Cold War in itself is nothing new. It is based upon the fact that a great power's government regards itself bound by an ideology whose eventual spread all over the earth it believes salutary and inevitable. Such a situation does not lead necessarily to war in the usual sense of the word, but the government in question will try to spread its ideology through propaganda and subversion. The measures taken against Catholics in sixteenth century Britain were due largely to

the fear of subversion on behalf of the great Catholic powers of that time. When Lenin came to power in Russia and when thereby the Communist ideology gained a great power basis, a new period of cold war started, such as had been unknown since the end of the French Revolutionary War.

The Second Congress of the Communist International at the end of July, 1920, adopted a number of theses drafted by Lenin. One of them read:

The world political situation has now placed the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day, and all events in world politics are inevitably grouped around a single central point—the struggle of the international bourgeoisie against the Russian Soviet Republic, which must gather around itself the Communist movements among the advanced workers of all countries and also all national liberation movements of colonies and oppressed peoples, who have become convinced through bitter experience that their salvation lies only in union with the revolutionary proletariat and in the victory of the Soviet Power over Imperialism.

For the Russian Communist government

the countries of the whole world were split into two hostile camps—the camp of Capitalism and the camp of Socialism, as a Declaration concerning the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1923) proclaimed. The Soviet Union was regarded not as a nation-state in the nineteenth century sense, not as a federal transformation of the former Russian empire comparable perhaps to the British Commonwealth of Nations or the *Communauté Française*, but as a decisive step on the road to the Socialist World Soviet Republic.

To the dynamic of this goal all means are subordinated. The Communist certainty of victory is based on a confidence free from all moral concepts. It starts from the conviction, to quote Engels:

that there must be a revolution in the methods of production and distribution which sets aside all differences of class, if the whole of modern society is not to suffer dissolution. On this tangible material fact, which is forcing its way irresistibly into the heads of the exploited proletarians in more or less clear shape, on this fact and not on the conceptions of right and wrong of this or the other arm-chair theoretician, is based the certainty of victory of modern Socialism.

From the beginning the Russian Communist government was conducting a cold war against "Capitalism," "Imperialism," and "the Bourgeoisie." But between 1918 and 1940 the main target of the cold war was, for obvious reasons, Western Europe and not the United States. The British and the French empires were expanding after World War I and seemed unshaken in the 1920's. Italian and German Fascism were, in the Communist interpretation, only more vigorous forms of capitalist imperialism. The United States, which was at that time pursuing a policy of isolationism and had little involvement in Asian and African affairs, receded into the background of the international picture, as seen from Moscow. But it should not be overlooked that the cold war is always a global war, seen from the Communist point of view, in which only the chief protagonists change from time to time according to shifts in the international power context.

This context was fundamentally changed by World War II. The Communist base expanded until it reached in 1949 a contigu-

ous territory stretching from the Elbe to Shanghai. The British and French Empires in Asia came to an end and they are coming to an end in Africa. Western Europe might gain real strength only by overcoming the nationalism and by abandoning the imperialism of each component nation. The example of France since the anti-democratic revolution of May, 1958, shows how slight the hope is for such a development. The only "capitalistic" nation which emerged greatly strengthened from World War II was the United States. Automatically it became the chief target of the Communist cold war. Without desiring such responsibility, the United States found itself the chief protagonist of the "capitalistic" or the "free" world. The United States had to adapt itself to this new situation. It should not be overlooked that basically we are not confronted with a conflict between the United States and the U. S. S. R., but with a conflict, inherent in Communist ideology, between the Communist power center and the outside world which by historical necessity is to become Communist too, though it may dislike it and resist it.

National Security

Under these conditions, what is the goal of United States foreign policy? In the age of nationalism and of nation-states the primary goal of foreign policy is national security. That holds true, of course, even at a time when thermo-nuclear weapons may be used in a war. New technological inventions have always influenced military strategy; they cannot change the fundamental facts of the context of international relations. Even ideological powers like Communist Russia, in the context of the age of nation-states, have to pursue a foreign policy based on national security. But at a time of dynamic ideological conflict national security includes elements which it would not contain in "normal" times. Not only the methods but also the concept of national security change with the general context of international relations. The national security of the United States is not only dependent on American military posture; economic, psychological and, above all, moral factors enter the picture.

It is an undue over-simplification to reduce

the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the question of whether war will break out between the two powers. Between 1922 and 1939 the U.S.S.R. did not start a war in the usual sense of the word. Nevertheless, it conducted its cold war. It is true that at that time the U.S.S.R. was economically weak and torn by internal dissension. Today the Soviet Union is economically strong and Khrushchev's dictatorship causes probably less dissension and fear than did Stalin's blood-thirsty tyranny. On the other hand, there is more at stake for the growing ruling class in Russia today, which would be endangered by a real war, than there was under Stalin.

"Capitalist" aggression against the U.S.S.R. is also an unlikely probability. Such danger really never existed after the consolidation of the Soviet regime in 1920. The Conservative British government of 1938, which had every good reason, as any free government has, to distrust the Communist regime—and especially that of Stalin who in the preceding years had ruthlessly sacrificed the Soviet peoples themselves, Communist and non-Communist—had clearly no intention to attack, directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union, as Communist propagandists at that time tried to persuade the world. By guaranteeing, in an unprecedented step, Poland's (and Rumania's) security against German aggression, Britain indirectly protected Russia against Germany. The Polish government had rejected previous German offers of a common action against Russia. It was Stalin who by his pact with Hitler in August, 1939, destroyed Poland and thereby made the German attack on Russia in 1941 possible. Nor did the United States make use of its tremendous technological superiority between 1945 and 1949 to prevent the expansion of communism.

Improbability of War

The foreign policy of the United States vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. must therefore be a policy which, although being prepared for war, does not regard war as very probable. It is not only thermo-nuclear weapons that make wars less probable than wars were at the beginning of the century; the attitude of peoples towards war has also changed. In World War I, at least in 1914–1915, nations

entered the war readily, and many people, even with enthusiasm. The picture had already changed by 1939, when not only in Paris and London but even in Berlin the people (in the case of Berlin the government differed therein from the people) entered the war with much more apprehension than enthusiasm. In the 20 intervening years the disapproval of war has grown. There may be exceptions like the approval in Israel and France for the war of 1956, but the overwhelming force of disapproval expressed everywhere was a stronger indication of the general trend. It is very difficult to substantiate any statement about the feelings and reactions of the Soviet people, but it is most probable that the Soviet people are deeply apprehensive of another major war. In the case of a thermo-nuclear war, not only the Russian people and soldiers would be in grave danger, but also the Communist leadership.

Considerations like these, however, will not lead to a relaxation of the tension that is caused by Communist ideology, nor can they lead to any real disarmament so long as the tension continues. And it should not be forgotten that the tension created by communism is not the only source of unrest in this world, nor the only threat which may in the future face the national security of the United States. The bi-polarization of the world as it existed around 1950 does not exist any longer. Probably it will lose even more of its importance in the future.

The various European nations which in the late 1940's were of little account have regained ample strength. In her foreign policy the United States has to take that into consideration. In 1947, the Communist world had only one power center, Moscow. Things have since become much more complex. Peking, Belgrade and Warsaw, have emerged, to a varying degree, as power centers of their own, and nobody can foresee where this unexpected (in 1947) development may lead. Above all, the whole world situation has been changed fundamentally since 1949 by the growing number of independent states in Asia and Africa and by the overthrow of dictatorships in Latin America.

The end of the colonial age has come not only for Asia but for Africa with unprecedented rapidity. There are dynamic forces

at work throughout the three great underdeveloped continents which will create in the 1960's, as far as can be foreseen, a new context of international relations, within which United States foreign policy against the U.S.S.R. and against communism in general will have to be redefined. No fundamental change can be expected, but the new situation may be as different from the late 1940's as these were from the late 1920's. These are all stages in one "protracted conflict," which communism started against the non-Communist world in November, 1917. It would be as mistaken to overlook this fact as it would be to overlook the changing configurations and the different attitudes and measures demanded in each of the various stages.

Policy in Europe

For the stage of development of the "protracted conflict" which set in with the end of World War II and which is now coming to its end, United States foreign policy has, on the whole, been successful. Thanks to it, communism did not expand in Europe; and Western Europe has consolidated its position to a remarkable degree. One has to compare today's situation with that of 1946-1947, to measure the success of United States foreign policy in Europe. By strengthening the security of Western Europe, the United States has strengthened its own national security. The purpose of United States foreign policy is not only the preservation of its national security, but at least indirectly, the preservation and growth of democratic liberty everywhere. Even from that point of view the balance sheet of Europe is positive. Democratic liberty is as safe today in Britain, in Scandinavia and in the Low Countries, as it has been throughout recent times. Democratic liberties were reestablished in Germany, Austria and Italy to a degree which 20 years ago no one would have believed possible.

True, democratic liberties do not exist in central-eastern Europe, including eastern Germany. This is deeply regrettable but it is not the fault of United States foreign policy. In eastern Germany no democratic liberties existed in 1939 and even in other central-eastern European territories not democratic, but semi-dictatorial regimes were in power

before these countries succumbed to Communist dictatorship. But that they succumbed to it was the fault of German policy, first by its pact of friendship with Stalin in 1939 and then by its aggression against Russia in 1941. It was German policy, and not American mistakes, which brought the Soviet army and Communist tyranny to Berlin and Prague, to Warsaw and Bucharest. In the spring of 1941, the whole of continental Europe, with the exception of two small enclaves, was ruled by four tyrannies which at that time seemed co-ordinated in their policies, the tyrannies of Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. That was less than 20 years ago. Today, largely thanks to British courage and to United States foreign policy, a very large part of Europe has been liberated from tyranny and has grown in liberty and wealth. The "sick man" of free Europe is at present France, where political stability, national self-confidence and economic order have been restored at the expense of democracy and at the tremendous cost of extolling nationalism and imperialist pride, a most dangerous anachronism. For this development United States foreign policy is hardly responsible.

That the United States was relatively successful in Europe is understandable. There we face old established nations which, at least at present and with the exception of the Iberian peninsula, share our cultural and political traditions. But the most important event of the twentieth century is the end of the European phase of world history, a phase which has lasted for four centuries and which has created the technical and intellectual premises for the emergence of a real world history instead of a history of fragmented civilizations. The process of emancipation which is now going on irreversibly in the "underdeveloped" countries is a part of the "Westernization" of the globe, in many ways its fruit and fulfillment.

The transition from colonial or semi-colonial status—politically, economically and culturally—to self-government and equality is an immensely difficult revolutionary process, which takes place in Cuba and Guinea, in Egypt and in Vietnam. This revolutionary transition came to most people as a surprise; few in 1945 expected the situation which we are facing in 1960 and which is

only the beginning of a far broader transformation.

Policy in Underdeveloped Areas

How far has United States foreign policy been successful in the underdeveloped countries which represent the majority of mankind and whose influence is rapidly growing? Again a considered judgment will be on the whole affirmative. The transition is proceeding more smoothly, especially in the former British colonies, than any one had a right to expect. The attitude of the United States in the attack upon Egypt in 1956 went far to reassure the underdeveloped countries that the period of armed imperialist intervention is past. The attitude of the United States in that case was supported by the majority of the free European peoples. The trip of Vice-President Richard Nixon to Ghana and to other independent states in Africa in the spring of 1957 was an indication of our sympathy for the aspirations of the African people. At the same time the definite though slow progress achieved in the last years in securing for our own colored fellow-citizens, in the North as much as in the South, a full share in the life of their country is in line with the general trend of the times. The fact that there are still islands of resistance to this trend—the cruel colonial war in Algeria, the position of Africans in the Union of South Africa, our support of dictators in Spain and Latin America—weakens the position of the West in its struggle with communism. For this struggle is not only one of military might or economic efficiency, but of ideas.

What should be the principles underlying United States foreign policy in the decade ahead? First: we must recognize that though the forms of the protracted conflict may change the conflict will go on. It is grounded in the very philosophy of communism. Should this philosophy change, it would mean the end of the protracted conflict and, also the end of communism. Nothing of that kind is in sight. Communism rightly feels stronger today than it was 10 or 25 years ago. Western civilization will have to face for any foreseeable future the contest with communism. This is in itself no misfortune. It forces the West not only into greater unity, into growing beyond the confines of the nation-state, but also into a new awareness of

its own principles of liberty for all and an earnest effort to apply them.

The United States may be the leader of this effort not because she is the strongest of the Western nations, but because modern Western civilization found here fewer obstacles of the past to overcome. This was partly due to the fact that the United States was a British colony, and England was at that time the most modern and liberal country. These fortunate conditions did not exist in Latin America.

Second: communism is as totalitarian a regime as fascism. From the rise of Lenin to the death of Stalin, from 1917 to 1953, it has shown the same traits of brutality and of disregard of human values as did National Socialism. In a Communist regime, even if it avoids excesses of brutality, there cannot be liberty. Leninism and liberty are mutually exclusive. But that does not mean that the Soviet Union of today can be compared with the Germany of 1939. The shades of Munich confuse more than they enlighten. Khrushchëv is not Hitler. He is not an impatient fanatic, but a shrewd and tough peasant-politician who knows how to bide his time. The Russian people are not the German people. Though the Russians expanded more widely than the Germans and fought many wars of conquest, glorification of war and the warrior as such has little place in their national mythology. Above all, after 1918, the Germans felt that they were a defeated people in a narrow territory in which they had no *Lebensraum* (this feeling was unjustified as proved by Germany today, which prospers with much less *Lebensraum*, but the feeling existed and was dominant in Germany before 1933).

(Continued on page 221)

Hans Kohn has been a student of nationalism for many years. Among his books are *Making of the Modern French Mind* (1955), *American Nationalism* (1957) and *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in Its Origins and Background*, published in 1944 and now in its seventh printing. He is a contributing editor of *Current History*.

As United States, British and French statesmen try to ward off the Soviet threat to the Western powers' status in Berlin, this author cautions "... that surrender in Berlin would lead to surrender in Germany, then in Western Europe, with the concomitant destruction of Nato that would pave the way for further Communist advances in Europe, Asia and Africa."

Berlin and the Balance of Power

By STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame

THE YEAR 1959 is the tenth anniversary of an unusually significant series of events. A decisive turning point in international politics was marked in 1949: the Nato treaty was signed in April of that year, soon afterwards the Berlin blockade was lifted and in September the first atomic explosion took place inside the Soviet Union. Some aspects of the present crisis over Berlin can best be evaluated in the light of these three momentous events.

I

It is generally agreed that the blockade of

In addition to his duties as Chairman of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Notre Dame, Stephen D. Kertesz has recently completed a study trip to ten Western European countries on a Guggenheim Fellowship. With M. Z. Fitzsimons, he has edited two symposia, *What America Stands For* and *Diplomacy in a Changing World*, published last summer. Mr. Kertesz was Secretary General of the Hungarian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, the Hungarian Minister to Italy in 1947, and visiting lecturer at the Yale Law School from 1948 to 1950. Author of *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union*, he has also edited *The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy*; and is a *Current History* contributing editor.


Berlin was lifted in May, 1949, because of the successful airlift. The Russians did not interfere with this operation since they were aware of the implications of the American atomic monopoly. Although this favorable position was not expressly used against the Soviet Union as a means of diplomatic pressure, it created for the United States a unique position in world affairs. This is probably the main reason why Stalin evacuated the northern part of Iran in 1946. He received a stern warning from President Truman to evacuate Azerbaijan or the United States would move in. Stalin understood the meaning of the message and moved out.¹

The atomic monopoly gave the United States a large margin of safety and probably contributed to a return to prewar complacency in military matters. Although the great American advantage gradually ceased to exist with the development of atomic weapons in the U.S.S.R., the complacent attitude did not change sufficiently. This situation made possible the new Berlin crisis created by the repeated threats of Nikita Khrushchev—couched often in very strong language.

Today both the American and Soviet armed forces possess an abundance of nuclear weapons and adequate means to deliver them. The apparent equality in nuclear armaments and the great Soviet superiority in the field of conventional armies have been counterbalanced by American military bases surrounding the U.S.S.R. and by an alliance system, the core of which is Nato. There

¹ President Truman has made this point in several public statements and specifically confirmed it in these words in a letter of March 13, 1959, to the author.

The Two Germanies



—From *The History of Germany: From the Reformation to the Present Day* by Minna R. Falk, New York, Philosophical Library, 1957.

fore, the major objective of Soviet diplomacy has become the liquidation of American bases abroad, with the crippling of Nato and the eventual isolation of the United States.

Simultaneously with spectacular Soviet successes in rocketry, the Kremlin tries to undermine the United States' leading position in world affairs. The maneuver of Soviet diplomacy is simple. If the West can be pushed out of Berlin and a Soviet sponsored disengagement established in major areas of Europe, Nato would be crippled, but the military power of the Soviet Union would not be affected at all. Proposals concerning the neutralization of Germany, the withdrawal of American, British and Canadian troops from the continent of Europe or the establishment of a German confederation with substantial Soviet influence in it—all such plans are only variations on the same theme. The Soviet "peace offensive" is waged on the entire front of Nato. Soviet policy advocates liquidation of foreign bases in Denmark and Norway, "no nuclear weapons and missile bases" in the Balkans and Italy, and "de-atomization" of Nato's central area through the Rapacki plan.

Neutralization may seem a fine idea in theory and under particular circumstances, but in a nuclear-missile age it is of very relative value. General Charles de Gaulle of France rightly pointed out that military neutralization of areas in Europe would make sense only if it were extended to the Urals. If Soviet diplomacy were able to lure the West in the direction of neutralization, all the successes that American diplomacy has been able to achieve since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine would crumble.

Russia's Peace Offensive

For the achievement of these objectives Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev began a political offensive in which Berlin was selected as a point of departure. In his speech of November 27, 1958, he advocated the creation of a "Free City of West Berlin" and demanded peremptorily the evacuation of Berlin by the Western armies within six months. Although he later expanded the time limit to one year and recognized the right of the Western powers to keep forces in Berlin until a peace treaty was signed, the

constitutive elements of the Soviet thesis have not changed.

Khrushchev made some of his points in public speeches, others in interviews, others in formal notes. He cleverly used the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* and argued that the conditions under which the original occupation agreement was made have fundamentally changed; thus, he says, the agreement is no longer applicable. If despite the new conditions the Western powers are unwilling to conclude a peace treaty with the two German governments, "the Soviet Union will still sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. The rights flowing from the surrender of Nazi Germany, extending to the territory of the German Democratic Republic will then cease to operate too." More recently a national magazine reprinted his remarks to Averell Harriman:

"Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. That is bluff." Khrushchev spoke with angry emphasis. "If you send in tanks, they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically," he added, and his colleagues around the table chorused the word "automatically."

... As for the Western troops in Berlin, he said he was ready to let them stay for a short time, even though he could not understand why we wanted to keep them there. "In the event of fighting they would be swallowed up in a single gulp." But he insisted that he would not agree to have any more Western troops enter Berlin, and those that are there must leave eventually. "These days of the occupation," he said, "are gone forever."²

It is understandable that Khrushchev considers Berlin, a free and prosperous city within the Iron Curtain, as "a bone in his throat." Although in the Soviet Seven Year Plan the satellite states and particularly Eastern Germany play an important role, how can the Soviet police regime feel accepted in these subjugated countries as long as Berlin is imbedded in the middle of the Communist land as a symbol of political freedom and economic well-being?

Some observers suggest that Khrushchev's threatening attitude is only one of the usual Soviet endeavors to create tension: he might

² *Life*, July 13, 1959, pp. 33, 34.

be trying to use blackmail to obtain another objective or simply fishing in troubled waters. These interpretations do not seem realistic. In all likelihood this time the West must face a crisis of great gravity, a more serious situation than the usual Communist probing action. In the last few years and particularly since 1957, the balance of military power has been undergoing a change in favor of the U.S.S.R. Khrushchev possibly intends to use this situation for the elimination of the Western island from the Communist sea. At the same time this could be the beginning of the liquidation of United States positions in Europe with world-wide repercussions.

A tough attitude in connection with Berlin might seem to be a good policy for Khrushchev for psychological reasons, as he tries to use the still existing anti-German feeling in Europe. The very unpleasant memories of two world wars and Nazi atrocities in Western European countries would make an all-out struggle over Berlin less than popular. It is not everywhere realized that surrender in Berlin would lead to surrender in Germany, then in Western Europe, with the concomitant destruction of Nato that would pave the way for further Communist advances in Europe, Asia and Africa.

The West is willing to evacuate West Berlin as soon as the two Germanies can be united on the basis of free elections. Until that time the West will remain there by right of belligerent occupation formalized in an agreement accepted by the Soviet Union. In order to obtain Soviet consent for the preservation of the *status quo* in Berlin until Germany is reunited, the West proposed at the Geneva Conference in June, 1959, a four-power declaration that embodied several concessions to the U.S.S.R.* For example, the West was willing to waive some forces in Berlin and to work out some mutual curtailment of propaganda and subversive activities.

The Kremlin refused to accept this conciliatory Western proposal as a basis of discussion but was willing to extend the time limit from one year to eighteen months for negotiation of a new status for West Berlin and for steps towards a German peace treaty in accordance with earlier Soviet proposals.

Thus Khrushchev showed a willingness to postpone again the deadline of his original ultimatum for Western surrender, but he was unwilling to make substantial concessions. The eighteen month or even longer period might be planned to coincide with an advantageous Soviet position in the missile race.

II

Although the Western powers probably could win their case before an international court, their situation in Berlin is less than enviable. In addition to the imbalance in conventional forces on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain and the existence of certain unfavorable psychological factors referred to above, the sheer physical situation of Berlin can be used for almost unlimited harassment. But it would be a mistake to give much credit to Soviet diplomacy for the origin of this unpleasant situation.

Since Winston Churchill suggested that "Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," many people are inclined to consider Soviet diplomacy more mysterious and shrewd than it actually is. Although it would have been difficult for Nikita Khrushchev to find a more favorable line of attack against a Western position than Berlin, the origin of the vulnerable Western position in the German capital cannot be attributed to devilish planning or foresight of Soviet diplomacy.

Plans for the zones of occupation in Germany were worked out by a British Cabinet Committee in the summer of 1943. According to the British proposal, Germany was to be divided into three main zones, each occupied by one of the three major Allies, and Berlin was to become a separate zone occupied by them jointly. Churchill commented:

In those days a common opinion about Russia was that she would not continue the war once she had regained her frontiers, and that when the time came the Western allies might well have to try to persuade her not to relax her efforts.³

Later this plan concerning the zones of occupation was forwarded to the European Advisory Commission and approved by the Quebec Conference in September, 1944.

These occupation zones were—as Church-

* For the texts of the Western "package plan," see pp. 239ff. of this issue.

³ Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), p. 508.

ill put it—"decided rather hastily at Quebec in September, 1944, when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany."⁴ At Yalta, on the insistence of the American delegation, Stalin accepted France as one of the occupying powers and eventually even as a member of the Allied Control Council in Germany, but the French zone was to be carved out of the zones assigned to Britain and the United States. This was considered a concession on the part of Stalin. The political implications of the military occupation were not even discussed in inter-Allied meetings.

Provisions securing free Western access to Berlin by highway, railroad and canal were not included in the inter-Allied agreements although several American agencies put forward such proposals. The right of access was considered as a natural corollary to the joint occupation and for a variety of reasons was not thought worth discussing with the Russians. The history of this omission could be an excellent case study of the pitfalls and shortcomings of the foreign policy-making process in democratic countries.⁵

Whatever the origin of the Berlin situation and the causes for the significant change in the balance of power in the last few years, American representatives must take into consideration the existing conditions in the world. Indulgence in wishful thinking or re-creation for past mistakes are not helpful.

During the last decade the world scene has changed substantially. Under the impact of the increasing Communist threat, the Truman Doctrine and various mutual assistance and economic aid programs were expanded and applied in different parts of the globe. Assistance and aid programs, bilateral treaties and regional agencies such as Seato, the Colombo Plan, and the Baghdad Pact, have created centers of cooperation among the United States, the Western world and the majority of mankind. Thus the United States, a country in which isolationism prevailed as late as 1939, has become an almost universal guarantor against aggression.

The feeling of hopelessness which dominated the European scene between 1945 and 1948 was changed by the application of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of Nato. The result has been the spectacular rehabili-

tation of Western European countries, a new era of cooperation in the North Atlantic area and the beginning of a process of integration in "Little Europe."

Germany Reconstructed

One of the most important changes of the last decade has been the reemergence of Germany as a great economic power and the reconciliation of the French and German nations. The recent accord on the Saar eliminated the last major political obstacle in their developing partnership. The Germans are more internationally minded today than any other European nation—at least on the official level. They are willing to make sacrifices for the sake of European cooperation and integration. This is a significant change since one of the causes of Europe's misfortune in the past has been the inability of the Germans to cooperate with their neighbors on the basis of equality. Although the reliability and permanence of this new German attitude are sometimes discreetly questioned by European nations which have had unpleasant experiences with the Germans in two world wars, it is of paramount Western interest to give all-out support to the existing genuinely democratic regime in West Germany. Even many anti-Communist Poles and Czechs distrust German rearmament. Naturally, the fears and ambitions inherited from past generations will not disappear in Europe overnight and the brutalities and crimes of the Hitler regime cannot be easily forgotten. But such feelings should not blur the postwar record of West Germany. The West German government has been dedicated to the defense of Western civilization, the destruction of which was Hitler's goal as well as Stalin's.

From the point of view of Western security, Nato's accomplishments have the greatest importance in the military, political and diplomatic fields. In many ways Nato is an unprecedented success in the history of multiple alliances. Recurring Communist aggression and threats greatly helped the development of Nato. In the early stages of its insti-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

⁵ Cf. Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 28 (1950), pp. 580-604; Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin*, (Princeton, 1957), pp. 360-365; "The Truth about the Berlin Problem," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 18, 1959, pp. 63-70; John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959), pp. 54-61.

tutional development, the European nations realized that what had happened in Korea might happen in Germany as well and the North Atlantic Council decided to set up an integrated military force under a centralized command. The creation of a peacetime unified military command of 15 countries is without precedent in history. Simultaneously with this institutional development, the principle of German participation in the common defense was accepted. As a result of changing attitudes in French politics, the German Federal Republic was only admitted to Nato in May, 1955. Today Germany has more divisions under Nato command than any other member state, although the German divisions are far from full strength.

Over and above concrete results, Nato's greatest merit is the degree of coordination in the foreign policies of the members and even more the growing habit of cooperation among Western diplomats and military leaders. This is not a small accomplishment in an alliance the members of which are to be found on both sides of the North Atlantic, stretch to the North Pacific and border on the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and some of which represent widely different traditions and outlook. Of course, the degree of integration and cooperation in Nato is far from satisfactory in view of the single-minded monolithic Communist dictatorships, but free nations cannot be forced into all-out cooperation by methods contrary to Western principles. The changing political scene outside and inside the alliance will always present new questions to be solved, for example, the problems raised by General de Gaulle over the leadership of the alliance and France's role in it. Such unsettled policies within Nato undoubtedly weaken the West. But the differences are often exaggerated by public discussions which are the natural though sometimes abused corollary of a democratic political system in both domestic and international relations.

For the United States, the days of isolationism are over and American interests and security cannot be restricted to the Western hemisphere. Today the United States is the recognized leader of the Western family of nations. In this unsought position of leadership, Nato's shield and military power afford security to the Americas as well, while Nato

activities facilitate fruitful cooperation in many fields of human relations.

Despite these favorable developments, we have no reason to be happy or satisfied with the turn of events of the last decade. The Soviet orbit is stronger than ever politically, economically and militarily. During the ten years of Nato's existence, Communist regimes consolidated their rule in China, East Central Europe and in the areas occupied by them in Germany, Korea and Indochina. The Soviet Union gained influence in such vital areas as the Middle East and Afghanistan and the Soviet economic and ideological offensive is gaining strength in other areas. During the riots in East Germany and the revolution in Hungary, the passive Western attitude proved that "liberation" was a slogan, not a policy. The abandonment of a free people in Berlin to Communist dictatorship would be a much greater blow for the West, an almost irreparable moral and political disaster.

Despite many adverse factors in the present Western predicament in Germany, renewed Soviet aggressiveness might turn into a blessing if the West reacts properly. This has been the case on numerous occasions since the Second World War. Soviet behavior in the United Nations, Communist aggression in Greece, Soviet reluctance to evacuate Northern Iran, Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and in the other satellite states, the Berlin Blockade, and aggression in Korea all contributed to changing complacent Western policies.

Although the wisdom of the abrupt changes in Western policy toward Germany and some measures of German rearmament can be disputed, Germany's new power position in the world is an accomplished fact. Russian apprehensions concerning the revival of German strength are understandable in view of the devastation in the U.S.S.R. caused by Nazi aggression. Germany has always been a most important country for the Soviet Union because the triumph of communism in Germany would mean the establishment of Communist control over Europe. Be this as it may, the radically changed Western attitude toward Germany was brought about by Soviet behavior in East Germany, the Korean war and general Soviet aggressiveness. The Kremlin can blame only itself

for Soviet policies and actions in Germany, some of which were unwise even from the point of view of Communist interests, and the West cannot turn back the wheels of history. German neutrality would have been acceptable to the West under certain conditions some years ago, but in view of changed conditions in Europe, it is no longer a realistic proposition. Soviet Russia's uncooperative and increasingly menacing attitude triggered developments which substantially altered Germany's position in world affairs. These developments have reached a point of no return and cannot be reversed to the situation which existed ten years ago.

German Reunification

The crux of the German problem is that no West German government can shelve the problem of reunification but must consider it as a primary national objective. Since, however, reunification depends to a large extent on the Soviet Union, the Kremlin could use this issue to influence decisively the course of events in West Germany—if the West German Republic in one form or another were abandoned by the West. Neutralization of Germany and the creation of a loose confederation between the two German states would mean today the detachment of Western Germany from Nato. This would in fact lead to Germany's isolation from the West, the opening of West Germany to Communist infiltration and subversion, and probably the gradual absorption of the two German states by the Soviet bloc. Even German nationalism and the natural German drive for unification would play into the hands of the Kremlin. Thus unification might be carried out simultaneously with Germany's incorporation into the Soviet orbit.

German reunification remains one of the major unsettled problems of the world and probably only time will solve what diplomacy cannot. Eastern Germany is a typical "made in Moscow" state which could not subsist one day without the presence of the Red Army. The creation of this state was not based on international agreement but on unilateral Soviet Russian decision and the status of this region may undergo still further changes according to the whims of the Kremlin. While West Germany has regular free elections, people in East Germany have

no occasion at all to express freely their will in political matters. The Soviet government is not willing to recognize the right of self-determination of the German people because this would be tantamount to the release of East Germany from Soviet captivity.

Until German unification becomes possible through free elections, the Western powers have no choice but to negotiate with the Soviet Union patiently, but firmly and realistically. However important the German problem in general and the Berlin issue in particular are, they are only parts of the total world problem and cannot be isolated from other relevant questions between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds. Since the United States has committed itself to defend Berlin, it seems necessary to act consistently with this obligation, not only at the conference table but in the broader context. Negotiations and defense efforts will influence the outcome of the Berlin issue, but these are interrelated problems and both warrant a few comments.

III

Diplomatic negotiations, and particularly conferences, with the Soviet Union since the second World War present an amazing picture. The Kremlin usually creates a crisis with a violation of an international agreement or with an unfounded claim, or the support of an outright aggression or subversion, and then, after much haggling, possibly offers a small concession from its extreme and usually arbitrary position. At international conferences Soviet representatives raise procedural issues, repeat arguments endlessly, emphatically deny facts or connect unrelated problems, and then may reverse their position without much regard to what they said in previous meetings. Negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers, at the Paris Conference of 1946, for the Austrian Treaty, and for the German peace treaty offer scores of examples. In the bewildering atmosphere caused by this strange Soviet behavior, even minor concessions bring general relief.

The explanation of the Russian attitude is simple. The meaning of an international conference is different for the Western and Soviet minds. In the past, an international conference was carefully prepared through regular diplomatic channels and the frame-

work of settlement was agreed upon before the conference was actually convoked. In contradistinction to this practice, an international conference is primarily an exercise in propaganda for the Communists and for this they need no preparation through diplomatic channels. Trotsky demonstrated this new brand of diplomacy for the first time in Brest-Litovsk. Khrushchev certainly has no intention of playing the conference game at the summit according to traditional Western rules, possibly he does not even know or understand them. He probably considers the summit meeting as a gigantic opportunity for propaganda, a convenient rostrum from which he can address the people of the world and inform them of the Soviet Union's superior power position.

Western nations are inclined to consider negotiation as an end in itself with the assumption that it will necessarily lead to an agreement or at least to a lessening of tension. In view of the basically different meaning of negotiation for the Soviet and non-Soviet representatives, this is an erroneous assumption. The American and particularly the British inclination toward compromise is probably harmful in negotiating with Soviet delegates, who may consider it a sign of weakness. Concessions do not impress people educated in the inexorable atmosphere of a monolithic society, but may instead strengthen their intransigence.

At the recent Geneva conference, the Western foreign ministers offered a series of unilateral concessions and possibly expected Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to reciprocate. From the outset the delegations from West and East Germany were admitted to sit at the plenary sessions of the Conference on the basis of equality. During the Conference the Soviet negotiators probably saw no reason why they should pay anything for points that were already conceded to them. Although Gromyko performed more gracefully than former Soviet Foreign Ministers Molotov or Vyshinsky used to, in essence he maintained the original Soviet position and refused to offer any realistic guarantee for Berlin's freedom. He was not impressed by the Western arguments and concessions.

The West possibly could have made the days at Geneva more unpleasant for the

Soviet delegation with somewhat different tactics. Since the basic problem involved in the German question is the principle of self-determination for seventeen if not seventy million Germans, the Western delegates could have repeated daily that they are willing to accept any kind of agreement which would secure free choice for the German people and they could have pointed out every day with equal force that the Soviet position denies self-determination to them although the Kremlin advocates this right for all Asians and Africans. Since today's open meetings of conferences are destined for a world-wide audience, the force of repetition might have been more effective than discussion of legal niceties. Such an attitude probably would not have improved the chances of a reasonable agreement but it is questionable that unilateral concessions did. Western willingness to freeze the crisis created by Khrushchev would not have eliminated the difficulties inherent in the Berlin situation and the key of the cold-storage locker would have remained in Khrushchev's hands. Although Soviet tactics at Geneva helped to strengthen Anglo-American-French unity, some basic weaknesses of Western diplomatic positions were revealed and this might have repercussions in other relationships.

Western Alternatives

The Western alternatives are poor at present. It is easy to criticize Western negotiators whose bargaining position has been weak indeed. A propaganda success would not have improved their negotiating position and would not have eliminated the difficulties involved in the German question. United States Secretary of State Christian Herter and his colleagues tried to make *eine gute Miene zum bösen Spiel* or the best of a bad deal, and accepted with good grace Andrei Gromyko's hot-and-cold technique and his various negative formulations or otherwise equivocal statements concerning the meaning of an interim agreement, an all-German commission, and other topics. In the early days of the second Geneva meeting the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, rightly commented on Gromyko's shifting tactics: "We are in complete confusion. We have reached a point at which neither side knows what the other is talking about."

Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, characterized Gromyko's frustrating performance as "negotiation by equivocation." Gromyko's maneuvers are, of course, directed by Khrushchev and Gromyko has no independence at all as was pointed out by Khrushchev himself to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in rather picturesque language.

The present crisis over Berlin, however, has a more serious aspect than the difference in negotiating behaviour between the Soviet and non-Soviet delegates.⁶ The shift which has been taking place in the balance of military power in recent years has inevitably created a more favorable negotiating position for Soviet leaders who are cynical power politicians. Khrushchev was willing to make serious concessions before the summit meeting of 1955, such as the evacuation of Eastern Austria. He did not threaten the West with annihilation and did not create a crisis by violation of international agreements. The fact that he is unwilling to give anything serious in return for Western concessions, not even a definitive withdrawal of threats, is the obvious consequence of the new balance of power which is more favorable to the Soviet Union than the one that existed five or ten years ago. For the same reason he may get the summit meeting anyhow. At the negotiating table he will not make concessions because of moral exhortations, legalistic arguments, flourishing economic conditions in the West or fabulous American weapons in the blueprint stage.

All factors considered, the United States is still the strongest military power though the Soviet Union is catching up rapidly and in some fields dangerously. Soviet successes in the field of inter-continental missiles and the launching of heavy sputniks influenced the climate of international politics and caused consternation among our friends on both sides of the Iron Curtain. They felt that we have let them down in a race which they cannot influence directly, but on which their

future depends. This feeling has been increased by repeated reductions of American conventional forces and the rather lethargic acceptance of fast-growing Soviet military capabilities. It is obvious to our friends that a gradual change in the balance of power cannot be counterbalanced by promising blueprints and moralistic-legalistic arguments over Western rights in Berlin.

Many Europeans believe that the Berlin threat became possible because American defense efforts are slackening on such wide fronts as civil defense, ground forces and missiles. Although the great Soviet superiority in ground forces has been a matter of public knowledge, considerable bewilderment was caused in Europe when President Eisenhower bluntly stated that: "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe." Another cause for concern is the seemingly passive American acceptance of the fact that the United States will become a second class power in the long-range missile field within two or three years when the U.S.S.R. will have, allegedly, at least a three to one missile superiority.

In view of the present state of the world, insufficient appropriations for defense purposes, paralleled by debates over orthodox fiscal policies, seem almost incredible to an outside observer and have far-reaching effects. In the course of a Senate debate over foreign aid authorization, Senator J. W. Fulbright aptly remarked: "We are not bankrupt, but we do look as if we were determined to end up the richest, fattest, most smug and complacent people who ever failed to meet the test of survival."⁸

It is true that strength in our time cannot be measured solely by a military yardstick. The West must meet forcefully the Soviet ideological challenge and the challenge of economic growth as well. Nikita Khrushchev will show little understanding for Western rights in Berlin, Germany, and elsewhere without a more explicit expression of Western unity and firmness and much greater American economic and defense efforts. Since he is not impressed by arguments and pledges which cannot be supported by force, any successful negotiation with him will be conditioned by two factors: (a) a more serious expression of Western determination to de-

⁶ Cf. the author's article "American and Soviet Negotiating Behavior" in Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons (eds.) *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1959), pp. 133-171.

⁷ Then President Eisenhower asked the question: "What good would it do to send a few more thousands or indeed even a few divisions of troops to Europe?" Later he referred to the 175 Soviet divisions and asked again: "... why in the world would we dream of fighting a ground war?" *The New York Times*, March 12, 1959.

⁸ *Ibid.*, July 9, 1959.

fend basic Western rights in Berlin, whatever the means necessary; (b) the reestablishment of America's leading power position in world affairs. The second condition is all-important and probably cannot be carried out without concerted fiscal and economic reforms. Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles warned the American people in a carefully worded speech that we could lose to the Soviet Union "because of our complacency and because they have devoted a far greater share of their power, skill, and resources to our destruction than we have been willing to dedicate to our own preservation."⁹

This writer is convinced that the United States will rise to the occasion. The pressing objectives of our challenging era can be achieved through a greater use of American productive capacity and a sober acceptance of the grim realities of the contemporary world. Luxuries should be less important in a free society than sacrifices for the defense of freedom. In all probability the American people would be willing to make the necessary adjustments to the contemporary situation if the consequences of further deterioration of the American power position were made clear to them by their political leaders. This seems to be an urgent task since the time lag which preceded American entry into both world wars and which was so important for American preparations will hardly be repeated in time of danger. The potential result of a creeping and temporarily comfortable indolence on the part of Western political leaders is simply frightening.

The Western answer to Khrushchev's threats and the aggressive Communist military challenge must be given in the light of the terrible alternatives of the nuclear age and the old Roman proverb: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, since Western relations with the Soviet orbit will remain peaceful as long as Western strength is respected by them. Pacifism and other movements which tend to

soften the will to resist Soviet expansion are harmful to Western interests and welcome news in the Kremlin. The current debate concerning the choice between an all-out nuclear war and abject surrender is not helpful to Western negotiators either. Life presents many more alternatives and it depends largely on the United States to see that the West is never confronted with this awesome choice.

Although the Kremlin has organized and sponsored numerous peace campaigns, Communist countries do not tolerate the counterpart of genuine pacifist movements and they have placed the development of military power ahead of improving living standards. Despite much Communist propaganda, it is obvious to all objective observers, even in the Soviet Union, that the United States will not start an aggressive war. The period of American atomic monopoly and the history of American-Russian relations displayed sufficiently the peaceful intentions and political methods of the United States. On the other hand, without strength the West cannot negotiate successfully about Berlin or any other issue with the rigid power politicians of the Kremlin. Khrushchev's boasts and threats have demonstrated the Communist reaction to Western weakness and it is not difficult to imagine how this attitude would develop in the case of a real preponderance of Communist strength.

Thus we may conclude that without greater and better organized American defense efforts, continued cooperation and friendship with the majority of mankind and a greater use of American productive capability, the negotiating position of American representatives will weaken rather than improve, and it will not make much difference whether negotiations take place on lake shores, on hills, in the mountains, or at the summit.

⁹ Department of State Bulletin, XL (1959), 589.

"We learned the hard way—at great cost both economic and political—that we must not let regret at political and social retrogression in an independent nation and dislike of tyranny lead us into an attempt to manage other people's affairs. We may use such diplomatic instruments as are available to resist moral, social and political catastrophe; beyond that it is unwise to go. . . ."

—Henry M. Wriston, President of The American Assembly, Columbia University, in an address delivered April 3, 1959.

This author divides the cold war into "three distinct phases: the containment phase . . . a liberation phase . . . and, finally, . . . a third phase . . . , 'containment reconsidered.' Presently, in dealing "with the countries of the Soviet bloc, American foreign policy has returned to the old containment line, which it has held firmly and along which it has tried to find practical solutions of day-to-day problems on a coexistence basis."

American Policy toward the East European Satellites

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THE PROBLEMS of the peoples of East Central Europe, especially their aspiration to freedom, were always followed with great interest by the American public. The popular admiration and hospitality with which the victims of the last Hungarian revolution were received in this country three years ago were the reflection of the same feeling of national and ideological kinship which produced so much enthusiasm and loud public acclaim for the cause of the Greeks, the Bulgars, the Poles and the Czechs whenever one or the other of these ethnic groups attempted in the past to secure more

national autonomy by revolts against their autocratic rulers.

In spite of this wide popular support on which it could have counted, the United States government held itself consistently aloof from East Central European affairs. Its policy toward the countries of this area is just about 15 years old. Only once before—at the end of World War I—did the United States formulate an official policy toward that area. This was when President Woodrow Wilson staked out as one of the war aims formulated in his famous Fourteen Points "the freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When the war was over and the isolationists got American foreign policy under their control, East Central Europe again became an area of "no concern" for the American government and stayed so for the next 20 years.

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved into the White House the American approach to world affairs showed once again a more international spirit. However, the official American attitude to the problems of East Central Europe was not affected much. Mindful of President Wilson's forced retirement from Europe and busy with urgent domestic problems, President Roosevelt did not show any particular interest in that area during the depression years. It was during this time that Hitler was renewing the old German *Drang nach Osten* and, with the help of Hjalmar Schacht's blocked mark

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schemes, was bringing one Danubian country after another into his *Grossraumwirtschaft* plan. In connection with these developments no official protest was to be heard from the United States.

The Nazi occupation of Austria, the partition of Czechoslovakia, Hitler's pact with the Kremlin, his invasion of Poland—all these events produced strong emotional reactions among the American public, yet they did not change the official American "hands-off" attitude toward the problems of that area. It was only when France collapsed and, ten months later, Denmark and Norway, and when the Nazi batteries took over the "protection" of the European Atlantic coast from the Pyrenées to the Arctic Circle that people in the United States started to realize that there was some connection between the events in East Central Europe and American security. However, it still took several years before an American policy toward that area was officially formulated.

When the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt did not want to commit himself to definite reconstruction plans. He expected American troops to come home as soon as the fighting in Europe ended, and he feared that he would have no control over the execution of any reconstruction plans. After all, was this not President Wilson's experience? Was he not posthumously glorified by some and blamed by others for developments—i.e., the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—which he did not plan? With this experience in mind President Roosevelt moved very carefully in dealing with East Central European problems. He did not want to become—as President Wilson had—the unintentional champion of a new political system in that area in which he did not expect to have much influence after the war. He preferred to leave this privilege and responsibility to his British partners. The fact that most of the provisional governments from the Nazi-occupied territories had their headquarters in London aided President Roosevelt in this noncommittal policy toward that area.

Early American Involvement

So it went until the end of 1944—until the time when the Red Army started to penetrate deep into the territories of Poland and of the

former Nazi satellites in the Balkans. By that time it was becoming clear that the ambitions of the Kremlin in these territories were much greater than merely the military defeat of Nazi Germany. The future division of power and super-power in the postwar world started to take shape. The United States could no longer afford to stick to its "no concern" policy toward the area where it faced the dynamic challenge of the Kremlin.

This historical change which forever marked the end of the "Fortress America" conception of American foreign policy occurred early in 1945 before and during the Big Three meeting at Yalta. Its shaping can be traced in the so-called Yalta Papers, published by the State Department as a special volume of the series entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States." More than the documents of the conference itself, the pre-conference briefing papers prepared for the instruction of the American delegation offer much interesting evidence about the early formative stages of American foreign policy toward that part of Europe.

Should the people of East Central Europe ever be allowed to read these briefing papers and compare them with other similar documents which were not written "for the record," they would be impressed by the honesty of the American attitude, by the absence of any references to the protection of American interest in that area, and by the self-imposed restraint from influencing the future political and social order in the respective countries. In this respect, the Yalta briefing papers are in striking contrast to the Soviet-British correspondence and memoranda reported by Cordell Hull and Winston Churchill in their memoirs. Although subsequent military events and Soviet political aggressiveness scrapped all such 50:50, 75:25 or 90:10 agreements about the future Soviet and British zones of influence in the Balkans, it will always be to the credit of the American government that it never participated in such deals.

The briefing paper on the liberated-to-be countries reflects this transformation of American foreign policy toward East Central Europe. While it marks the departure from the old American "no concern" attitude toward that area, it still does not count on a direct participation of the United States in

the opening East-West struggle and believes that the United States will have to participate in it more as an arbiter. "...Growing evidence of *Anglo-Soviet rivalry*"—the briefing paper says—

and the resulting power politics scramble for position are due less to the difficulties over territorial questions than to the question of the political character of the governments in various countries of Europe beyond the Soviet borders. . . . On the one hand, it is evident that the *Soviet government suspects that Great Britain* desires to see installed wherever possible right-wing governments. . . . On the other hand, the *British view with apprehension the possibility that the Soviet Government* will endeavour in its turn to install and support left-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe. . . . Judging from the present indications the general mood of the people of Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and social reforms. . . . Interim governments . . . must be sufficiently to the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe and to allay Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be sufficiently representative of the center and petit bourgeois elements of the population so that they would not be regarded as mere preludes to a Communist dictatorship. . . . In so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that it should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it should favor social and economic reforms. (Italics in the quotation are the author's.)

Yalta

Translated in the diplomatic language of the Yalta Conference, this American recommendation was incorporated in the official Declaration on Liberated Europe in the following form: quoted from Protocol on Proceedings, February 11, 1945, Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Sec. II, Dept. of State Release 239, March 24, 1945.

"... The three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state . . . (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The hopes of a peaceful Soviet-American postwar collaboration dissipated rapidly when, soon after the Yalta Conference, the Kremlin started to violate the stipulations of the Yalta Agreement in one country after another. Unilateral Soviet actions such as recognition of the Lublin regime in Poland, establishment of the Groza regime in Rumania, support given to Tito against Mihailovich in Yugoslavia, and the land deals with the Poles at the cost of Germany—these and other actions of the Soviet regime were the first storm signals in the skies of the wartime allies.

Potsdam

At Potsdam the Western group tried in vain to remind Stalin of his Yalta commitments toward them and toward the peoples of East Central Europe. While Stalin made certain concessions of form, he got his way in Poland and he made it clear that in his control over the former Nazi satellites—Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary—he would not move an inch. He dismissed all Western protests concerning his administration of these territories, and in order to turn the United States attention away from this area he raised a bargaining claim for Russia's equality with the United States in the military control of Japan. He condemned American insistence on free elections as a desire to establish "anti-Soviet" regimes in all the liberated countries.

As long as Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were under the Red Army's occupation there seemed to be no possibility of securing any civil rights for their people by diplomatic negotiations. In the hope that the conclusion of peace treaties with these former Nazi satellites would terminate the Russian military occupation, the Western allies took part, nominally at least, in the peace conference and signed the peace treaties with them. However, the United States government made it clear that by doing so it did not approve the respective regimes which were put into office by Russian authorities without the holding of free elections as was agreed upon at Yalta. The purpose of terminating the military occupation of the three countries was not achieved. The Kremlin justified its staying by the necessity of assuring communication and transportation lines with Austria

and, when Austria also got its peace treaty, by the provisions of the Warsaw Pact.

In March, 1947, the cold war became a harsh reality. The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine which accompanied the President's proposal to grant military assistance to Greece and Turkey made this clear. The theoretical justification of this historical event in the development of the American foreign policy was formulated by George Kennan in his well-known article which appeared the same year in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs* entitled *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*.

Cold War Development

In retrospect the 12 years of the cold war appear to be divided into three distinct phases: the containment phase of the cold war (1947–1952) was followed by a liberation phase (1953–1956) and, finally, by a third phase which is still in progress and could well be labelled “containment reconsidered.” The milestones separating these phases of American foreign policy were the change of the political administration in Washington in 1953 and the Hungarian revolution in 1956.

The first containment phase of the American cold war strategy brought some remarkable results. On its credit side appeared such valuable achievements as the stemming of the Communist tide in Italy and in France, the conversion of Turkey and Greece into powerful allies at the doorsteps of the Communist empire. Western European economic recovery, the Berlin airlift and the defense of South Korea. On its debit side, as the critics of that policy liked to emphasize, were booked the loss of China and the loss of Czechoslovakia. This charge was correct in both cases only with regard to the final act of the drama which had been in progress since the end of the war in these two countries. The process of the military defeat of nationalist China and that of the subversive political liquidation of democratic Czechoslovakia were too advanced by 1947 to be reversed by the enunciation of the containment doctrine. Moreover, on the balance sheet of the United States' policy toward the satellite countries, the loss of Czechoslovakia was offset by one valuable credit item—the defection of Tito.

In spite of all these positive achievements of the containment policy under the Truman-Acheson team, the policy became a target of the Republican election campaign in 1952. The seemingly more dynamic concept of liberation was superimposed on it. The Republican election platform denounced the “negative, futile, and immoral policy of containment which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism, which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction.”

The first act which was supposed to serve the purpose of the new administration's positive foreign policy was the “Captive Peoples' Resolution” which, in the words of Secretary of State John F. Dulles, was designed as “a solemn act of dedication for the future. . . a foundation upon which future foreign policies can again build a structure of peace, justice, and freedom.” When he asked the Congress to join the President in this solemn act by adopting the resolution, he summarized its objectives as follows:

One, the United States does not countenance the violations by which Soviet leadership has perverted past agreements and understandings into chains of bondage. . . .

Two, the United States will never be a party to any international “deal” or “trade” confirming the rule of Soviet despotism over the alien peoples it dominates in Europe and Asia. . . .

Three, the United States seeks, as one of its peaceful goals, that these enslaved national groups of Europe and Asia shall recover genuine independence. . . .

The draft of this resolution and some comments which accompanied it in Congress and in the press raised the question whether it was meant to be a step toward the repudiation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. Loose talk about secret and unknown clauses of these agreements, about the “betrayal” of 80 million people behind the Iron Curtain by the old administration, and other similar post-electoral party trench shooting added to the confusion. Moreover, the debate somewhat alarmed the West European allies, who became jittery about getting involved in some liberation crusade. On the other hand, critics of the new foreign policy pointed to the fact that repudiation of the agreements would accomplish nothing and that it would result in just another demonstration of

American weakness in that area. "Tearing up our copies of scraps of paper torn up long ago by the Russians is not likely to persuade them to move out of Warsaw," wrote *The Reporter*.

After several months of heated debates, the first round of the administration's fight for its new foreign policy toward the Soviet satellites came to a close. The "realists" won it. The draft of the "Captive Peoples' Resolution" with other proposals of similar intent was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs where hearings were conducted which failed to lead to any positive Congressional action.

In June, 1953, workers' riots in Eastern Germany and in Czechoslovakia offered another opportunity for the testing of the new American policy toward that area. As always in the past, the American public and its press showed admiration for the rebels and warm sympathy for their cause. It took three weeks for the American government to react to these events and it did so only by offering food shipments for the population in the distressed areas—a gesture which was sarcastically declined by the satellite governments.

The American failure to act upon the 1953 revolts revealed the wide discrepancy between the liberation policy speeches and the policy itself. Nevertheless, official references to liberation, even when hedged by such words as "by peaceful means only," continued in the following years to stir up the imagination of emotional people on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It gave rise to additional fears on its Western side and, on the Eastern, to many unjustified hopes. The Hungarian revolution brought this tragic misunderstanding clearly to light. Since then official references to liberation have been less frequent, and, when made, they sounded more like expressions of faith in God's justice in this world than like statements of a clearly defined policy. For its current dealings with the countries of the Soviet bloc, American foreign policy has returned to the old containment line, which it has held firmly and along which it has tried to find practical solutions of day-to-day problems on a coexistence basis.

One more point can be made in favor of United States policy toward that area. The social change in process in these countries

was correctly diagnosed in the briefing papers prepared for the Yalta Conference that were quoted above. Both the Democratic and the Republican administrations made it very clear that they would not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Soviet bloc countries once they regained the right of political self-determination. Both American Secretaries of State who directed the foreign policy of the United States in the last ten years made explicit statements to this effect. "We do not insist," said ex-Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950, "that these governments have any particular political or social complexion. What concerns us is that they should be truly independent national regimes. . . with a decent foundation in popular feeling." And five years later, after his visit with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed the same commitment:

We reached common accord on recognizing the importance of independence for these states, non-interference from the outside in their internal affairs, and their right to develop their own social and economic order in ways of their own choice.

Yet Soviet propaganda ignored this solemn American Declaration when it repeatedly charged the United States with attempting to re-introduce capitalism under the pretext of concern for the people of the satellite countries.

What seem to be the major accomplishments of American foreign policy toward the countries of East Central Europe? How was the cause of American security affected by this policy? Some of the accomplishments credited to the Democratic administration are already listed above. Under the present administration the following were added: The conclusion of the peace treaty with Austria followed by the withdrawal of Soviet occupational forces from that part of Central Europe; the liquidation of another European trouble spot—Trieste; continuation of friendly cooperation with Yugoslavia and support of its efforts to stay out of the reach of the Kremlin's control; renewed contacts with the Polish people by private and public assistance programs, by cultural exchanges, and so forth; recognition of the old American property claims by all East Central European countries and the opening of negotiations

concerning their settlement; the resumption of official American relations with some of the regimes, and—with the exception of Hungary—relaxation of tension in diplomatic relations with others.

Renewal of American-Polish Relations

Among all these events that marked the trend of American relations with the countries of East Central Europe in recent years, the most heartening change concerned American relations with Poland. Uncertainty about the share of American responsibility on the "sell-out" of Poles at Yalta—as it was often referred to later—created a feeling of a certain moral obligation toward the Poles among the American public. There was a desire to prove to them that they were not forgotten here. The Poznan revolt and the opening of Poland's "windows to the West" offered the expected opportunity. American private foundations made research and educational funds available to the Poles; cultural exchange visits were resumed; American medicines were shipped to Polish hospitals; an agreement concerning the operations of the CARE organization in Poland was concluded; limitations upon the sending of American gift packages to Poland were lifted; the numbers of American tourists visiting Poland multiplied from summer to summer and have become an important source of Poland's dollar income; and President Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe* reached for some time the best seller list on the Polish book market.

The American Congress was also willing to show its recognition of political changes in Poland and took under favorable consideration the Polish request for financial aid. After the change of certain provisions in the foreign aid laws which limited the use of such funds to non-Communist countries, Congress approved for Poland a loan of \$95 million, the first American loan ever given to a country behind the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, since then tighter integration of Poland's economy into the Soviet bloc created doubts on the American side about the sincerity of First Secretary of the Communist party Wladyslaw Gomulka's attempts to gain more independence from Moscow. This accounts for this year's reduction of the American aid to \$50 million only. In spite of this Poland

still remains the freest of the Moscow-controlled states and the only one among them which allows its people to maintain contacts with the Western world that bring them intellectual stimulation and, occasionally, material benefits.

U.S.-Yugoslav Cooperation

Equally important politically and even more important militarily for the security of the free world was the further development of American cooperation with Yugoslavia. After the United States in the early 1950's enabled Tito by prompt help to succeed in making good his escape from the Kremlin's bondage, Yugoslavia became the bastion of the American containment policy. It was receiving aid every year under the Mutual Assistance Program, both military and economic. In military aid it received in total close to one billion dollars. In economic aid it received in the last ten years some \$750 million, partly as defense support, partly in the form of surplus food.

Moreover, it received from the United States' and United Nations' financial agencies various development loans such as for the construction of a fertilizer plant, for the purchase of Diesel engines, for the modernization of its mines, and so forth. This helped Tito to maintain his independence from the rest of the Soviet bloc and to build up his prestige internationally. He did not follow the comrades from the Kremlin when they paid him their penitentiary visit in 1955, but he also was reluctant to follow his Western friends when they tried to stimulate him by means of the Balkan Pact into closer cooperation with the two Nato countries, Greece and Turkey. Since 1958, he has preferred to renounce American military aid and to remain neutral between the two power blocs rather than accept limitations of his freedom of speech and action in closer military association with the West.

The political investment that the United States made with a high calculated risk in Yugoslavia and later in Poland contributed to the development of forces that brought about the fragmentation of the Kremlin's control over its East Central European empire. For American security, this seems to be the most promising development in that area so far.

Commenting on the deterrence policy, this author points out that "If the United States does not have the defensive capability to cope with Soviet missiles, and if at the same time the Soviet Union can neutralize our deterrent power, the Russians might well be tempted to aggressive military action." Here is a summary of relative Russian-American military strength and an analysis of arms reduction possibilities. "While lack of confidence remains so complete," concludes this specialist, "even the slightest reduction in conventional arms may appear too risky." The arms competition is therefore "likely to remain part of the international scene for the foreseeable future."

American-Russian Arms Competition

BY ALLAN S. NANES

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
FOR OVER a decade now the United States has been faced by a multifaceted challenge from the Soviet Union. In every phase of life, from steel production to athletics, from aid to underdeveloped areas to the concert stage, the Soviet Union is embarked upon a mighty effort to attain the goal which Khrushchev has proclaimed, to overtake and surpass the United States. This challenge is mounted in the belief that if the Soviet Union can truly attain the status of the world's number one power, the triumph of communism will be assured.

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In no area is this competition more crucial than in that of armed strength. Mr. Khrushchev brought this home to us once again in his challenge on Berlin, for his very threat forced us to ask ourselves a number of vital questions. Did the United States have sufficient power to back up the Western position in Berlin? If not, would the Western position in Berlin collapse, with probable grim consequences for Western policy as a whole? If the Soviet Union were forcibly to challenge our position in Berlin, how would we meet such a challenge? In short, Mr. Khrushchev made us consider once again the absolutely inescapable nexus between the condition of our armed forces and the alternatives of our foreign policy.

Of course our defensive stance, and with it our foreign policy, are governed by our basic analysis of our adversary. Under Mr. Dulles that analysis was inclined to be optimistic, optimistic in the sense that in the long run we believed communism to be self-destructive, and bound to fall of its own weight. Under both Mr. Dulles and his predecessors our guiding strategic principle has been that of deterrence, namely such swift and destructive retaliation that no nation will launch an aggressive attack against us, or against those nations with whom we have binding alliances. The instrument of this strategy

United States Collective Defense Arrangements



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)

1 UNITED STATES
2 CANADA
3 ICELAND
4 NORWAY
5 UNITED KINGDOM
6 NETHERLANDS
7 DENMARK
8 BELGIUM
9 LUXEMBOURG
10 PORTUGAL
11 FRANCE
12 ITALY
13 GREECE
14 TURKEY
15 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RIO TREATY (21 NATIONS)

1 UNITED STATES
16 MEXICO
17 CUBA
18 HAITI
19 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
20 HONDURAS
21 GUATEMALA
22 EL SALVADOR
23 NICARAGUA
24 COSTA RICA
25 PANAMA
26 COLOMBIA
27 VENEZUELA
28 ECUADOR
29 PERU
30 BRAZIL
31 BOLIVIA
32 PARAGUAY
33 CHILE
34 ARGENTINA
35 URUGUAY

ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) TREATY (3 NATIONS)

1 UNITED STATES
36 NEW ZEALAND
37 AUSTRALIA

PHILIPPINE TREATY (BILATERAL)

1 UNITED STATES
38 PHILIPPINES

JAPANESE TREATY (BILATERAL)

1 UNITED STATES
39 JAPAN

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (South Korea) TREATY (BILATERAL)

1 UNITED STATES
40 REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY (8 NATIONS)

1 UNITED STATES
5 UNITED KINGDOM
11 FRANCE
36 NEW ZEALAND
37 AUSTRALIA
38 PHILIPPINES
41 THAILAND
42 PAUSTAN

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Formosa) TREATY (BILATERAL)

1 UNITED STATES
43. REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FORMOSA)

—From *The Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1959, A Summary Presentation*, The Departments of State and Defense and the International Cooperation Administration, February, 1958.

has been, and still is, the manned bomber, although in the not too distant future it will be replaced by the intercontinental ballistic missile.

America's reliance on deterrent strategy is reflected in the composition of our armed forces. Thus the largest share of defense funds has ordinarily been allocated to the Air Force, with the Army and Navy receiving somewhat less. The numerical strength of our Army is now 870,000,¹ as compared to the Red Army's 2,500,000.² In the area of closest confrontation, Germany, the United States has 200,000 ground troops, but of these only 65,000 make up the five pentomic combat divisions. The armies of our principal allies are roughly as follows: Britain, 303,900³ France, 705,000⁴ with the bulk in Algeria; and West Germany, 123,000.⁵ Sixty thousand French troops are in Germany, of which only two divisions are combat ready, while British forces there number 55,000.⁶

Facing these Nato forces in Germany are 300-350 thousand Soviet troops, organized in 20 divisions, half of them armored.⁷ Soviet divisions, incidentally, now approximate the size of an American division, instead of roughly half the size, as they did before.⁸ These Soviet divisions are presumed to be superior to most Nato divisions, although the American pentomic divisions carry more firepower. In general the United States takes the position that nuclear weapons available to its forces in Western Europe give Nato the edge over Russia's superiority in manpower. In fact, General Norstad has said that Nato's nuclear strength is such that Khrushchev would realize that he couldn't win an all out war.⁹

Limited War Equipment

But in the minds of many critics of our military policy is the question of whether we will ever have to fight an all out war. Certainly it is not difficult to envision a situation calling for a lesser response to a lesser challenge. Our preparations to fight limited wars cause anxiety to many. They point out that our forces are thinly scattered around the world, and that our Strategic Army Corps, designed to fight "brush fire" wars, consists of only four divisions, soon to be re-

duced to three. In addition, it lacks adequate airlift. Thus it has been stated that with the airlift now available it would take 17 days to move a single division to the scene of trouble.¹⁰ Even allowing for some exaggeration in that estimate, there is evidence that the Lebanon operation strained the facilities of military air transport. Finally, there is the allegation that the Soviet army is equipped with more modern weapons than is ours.

What these critics fear is that if we are not properly equipped to fight limited wars we face the unhappy alternatives of permitting local Communist aggressions to succeed, and to become cumulatively more damaging, or of retaliating against a local aggression with an all out nuclear assault, thus plunging the world into a holocaust. If this happened we would most likely forfeit all chance of support from the neutrals, and might hope for only the most reluctant support from our allies. This anxiety was not stilled when the President, in his press conference of March 11, 1959, replied as follows to a question as to whether our ground forces were capable of handling a brush fire situation: "I'd say this: If we can't, then the war's gotten beyond a brush fire, and you've got to take something—you've got to think in much, much bigger terms."¹¹ While this statement may appear to downgrade the possibility of a limited war, we should remember that the President was answering against the background of the Berlin crisis, and that many military analysts would agree that insofar as Europe is concerned, the chances of limiting any conflict in that area are minimal.

When we turn to naval strength the picture is somewhat more reassuring, although certainly not one to give cause for complacency. There are 630,000 men in the

¹ Washington Post and Times Herald, January 20, 1959, p. A 14.

² Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1959, p. 16.

³ Defence Statistics, 1959/1960. London. H.M.S.O. p. 4. This represents the total army strength, not just the regulars.

⁴ Washington Post and Times Herald, February 8, 1958, p. A 9.

⁵ "East vs. West: The Force Behind all the Talk," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 13, 1959, p. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 39.

⁸ Hanson Baldwin, *The Great Arms Race*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958, p. 36.

⁹ *U.S. News and World Report*, *op. cit.* p. 39.

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, 86th Congress, 1st session. Vol. 105, No. 90, Daily edition. Wednesday, June 3, 1959, p. 8755. Speech of Hon. Leroy Anderson.

¹¹ *New York Times*, March 12, 1959, p. 12.

navy, and an additional 175,000 in the marines. The latter, of course, still play their traditional role as shock troops, and perhaps should be counted with our land forces. The United States has far more ships altogether, but the Soviet Union has outbuilt us in submarines and cruisers since World War II.¹² The Soviet Union, as far as we know, has no attack carriers, and no small carriers, while in 1958 we had 15 of the former and 8 of the latter. The Russians exceed us in the number of cruisers, although not by much, while we have a sizeable margin in destroyers.

Perhaps the most notable development in the past year is that the Soviet submarine program has apparently been cut back. Whereas estimates of Soviet submarine strength had gone as high as 600, the official estimate is now in the neighborhood of 450.¹³ Of course, any cutback in production of regular submarines may be the result of a shift of production facilities to their nuclear brethren, or even to missiles. However, we do not know of any Soviet nuclear submarines in commission, while we have six, with twenty-seven more authorized.¹⁴ Nine of these latter are to carry the Polaris missile, and one of them has already been launched. In addition, four cruisers and four submarines are equipped to launch the Regulus I missile, while the Regulus II program has been cancelled.¹⁵

A fleet of these nuclear powered missile firing submarines would of course greatly enhance our power vis à vis the U.S.S.R., and indeed in time, with the solution of many technical problems, might constitute a so-called "invulnerable deterrent." However, the Soviet Union is equally aware of these potentialities and probably has a nuclear submarine program of her own, as has been mentioned. It is known that the Russians have fitted a number of submarines for the launching of short range air breathing missiles. Defense against a missile attack originating from submarines is an even more difficult problem, because of the mobility of the launching site, than defense against a land-based missile attack, and to date the latter problem has not been solved.

If there is an Achilles heel, so to speak, in our naval establishment, it arises from a growing maintenance problem. Continuous

sea duty and cumulative obsolescence have multiplied the breakdowns of combat ships and amphibious craft, as the Lebanon landings brought home.¹⁶ But overall, the Navy believes it has an advantage over the Russians based on experience, tradition, and élan. In this the American people probably agree.

Balance Sheet for Bombers

Although the future of the manned bomber appears cloudy, it is still the prime element on which our strategy is based. The total inventory of American military aircraft as of the end of fiscal year 1959 has been given as 35,589.¹⁷ This number is broken down as follows: Air Force, 20,800; Navy, 9,500; and Army, 5,289. The hard core of American airpower is, of course, the Strategic Air Command, with its 2000 jet bombers capable of carrying thermonuclear bombs. But of this number, 1500 are B-47's, an airplane that is in a state of rapid obsolescence. The remaining 500 are B-52's, a newer aircraft, with a longer range. In addition, the tanker plane that refuels the B-52 is more adaptable to jet operations than that used for the B-47.

Before the end of 1960 it is planned to increase the B-52 force to approximately 630 airplanes. The B-47 will eventually be replaced by the B-58 delta wing bomber. Air Force plans call for 200 B-58's, but to date financing is available for only 106.¹⁸ In the not too distant future the B-52 will probably have to be replaced, and for that job the leading candidate is the B-70, a bomber capable of intercontinental ranges without refueling. Looming in the background is yet another aircraft, a nuclear powered bomber.

A few years ago it appeared that the Soviet Union was going to mount a formidable challenge to the United States in the area of strategic bombing. A bomber we called

¹² Baldwin, *op. cit.* p. 24.

¹³ U.S. Congress. House. Appropriations Committee. Policy Statements. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. 86th Congress. 1st session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1959. Part I. p. 614.

¹⁴ Congressional Record. 86th Congress. 1st session. Daily edition. May 6, 1959, p. A3767.

¹⁵ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Major Defense Matters. Hearings by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. 86th Congress. 1st session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1959. Part I. Pp. 182-183.

¹⁶ Braestrup, Peter. "Limited Wars and the Lessons of Lebanon." *The Reporter*. April 30, 1959, p. 26.

¹⁷ Robert Hotz, "USAF Faces Technical, Budget Problems," *Aviation Week*. March 9, 1959, p. 73.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

"Bison" seemed comparable to our B-52, if not better. Furthermore, the Soviets were apparently producing it at a faster rate than we were turning out ours. Now the Bison fleet is believed to number no more than 100, and production has apparently been halted.¹⁹ Once again this cutback has been attributed to a Soviet decision to concentrate on missiles. However, the Russians have not yet put all their eggs in the missile basket, for the Bear, a huge bomber comparable to our B-36, and equally obsolescent, is probably still in use by the Soviet Air Force, in greater numbers than the Bison. There is also the Badger, a medium bomber of highly rated performance, and a six jet delta-wing craft called the Bounder now coming into production.²⁰

Although these Soviet bombers appear to be considerably inferior numerically to those available to SAC, their very existence poses a serious political problem for America. For their range is sufficient to reach most of the SAC bases overseas, bases which in the case of the B-47 are a necessity if our deterrent policy is to have any meaning whatever. Thus, even without missiles, the Soviet Union is in a position to bring very heavy pressure on our allies, who are understandably fearful of nuclear bombs, whatever the means of delivery.

The total Soviet military aircraft inventory is also somewhat smaller than ours, as it numbers approximately 25,000. In fighters, fighter-bombers and ground support craft, the Russians apparently possess more machines than we do. What is more they have proven that they can build first class aircraft of these types.²¹

America's strength in fighter, fighter-bomber, and interceptor aircraft is organized in the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and of course, in naval aviation. The first of these possesses about 1900 planes, mostly F 89's, F 102's, F 104's and F 86's. The F 101B and the F 106, both capable of being automatically guided to their target by the SAGE (Semi Automatic Ground Environment) control system, should soon be coming into service with this Command.²²

The Tactical Air Command, organized with limited war situations in mind, is equipped with F 100D tactical fighters, Mc-

Donnell RF 101 Voodoo supersonic reconnaissance fighters, B-57 tactical bombers, (now being phased out), B-66 photo and weather reconnaissance bombers, some older fighters and a number of transport aircraft. A number of these planes can deliver nuclear bomb loads, and several types are equipped to carry either the Falcon or the Genie air-to-air missiles. Matador surface-to-surface missile wings of this command are now stationed overseas, with the Matador scheduled to be replaced by the Mace, a newer higher performance missile.

According to one source, "As it stands the air arm of the U.S. Navy and Marines amounts to the third biggest air force in the world."²³ Be that as it may, the Navy deploys about 9,500 aircraft. A number of these also carry a varied missile arsenal, including the Sidewinder, which was developed by the Navy.

However, the days of the manned interceptor, like those of the manned bomber, appear numbered, except for possible limited war use. The job of air defense is already passing to missile weapons systems. In fact, it was over the question of missile systems for air defense that interservice rivalry flared once again this past spring.

Balance in Air Defenses

To date our defense against air attack has been based on early warning plus point defense. Thus we have built, in cooperation with Canada, the DEW line across the Dominion's extreme north, the Mid-Canada line, and the Pinetree radar line, skirting the United States-Canadian border. This has been supplemented by early warning planes, radar picket ships and Texas towers, built in the ocean. For defense of major population centers in addition to interceptors we have relied on the Army's Nike missile. The latest Nike, the Nike Hercules, is already operational, and the Army has pushed vigorously for its expanded production. The Air Force, in turn, wanted a defensive missile of greater

¹⁹ *Wall Street Journal*, March 25, 1959, p. 16.

²⁰ "How U.S. Defenses Stack Up with Russia's." *Business Week*, Jan. 3, 1959, p. 13.

²¹ See the author's, "The Russian Military," *Current History*, January 1958, p. 11.

²² *The Air Force Blue Book*. The USAF Yearbook. Vol. I. New York. Military Publishing Institute, Inc. 1959. p. 21.

²³ Green, William and John Fricker. *The Air Forces of the World—Their History, Development and Present Strength*. New York. Hanover House. 1958, p. 322.

range and sophistication, and for this purpose it had developed the Bomarc. The Bomarc is a surface to air missile with a 200 mile range, but its improved version will double that. The Nike Hercules, on the other hand, has a range of only 100 miles, and does not possess some of the other capabilities of the Bomarc. But the Hercules is in being, while the improved Bomarc had yet to be turned out in quantity. The upshot was a characteristic compromise, with the Administration retaining both missiles, cutting back in the projected expenditures for both, and allotting increased funds for the development of an operational anti-missile missile.

Data on Soviet air defense is fairly difficult to come by, with the exception of fighter aircraft. Some writers have attributed a slight advantage in air defense to the Russians, some see us in the lead, and others claim that Russia's air defenses are so potent as to cancel out the chance for effective retaliation.²⁴

The Missile Gap

We now turn to the heart of the matter, at least as far as the public is concerned, namely the status of the two supercarriers with respect to missiles, more specifically intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Is there a difference in the position of the two powers, and if so, is this difference of any significance?

The replies to these questions show a sharp divergence, a divergence occasionally attributed to political motivation. In general the consensus appears to be that the Russians are ahead of us in what Senator Lyndon Johnson has called "the ability to put heavy objects into space."²⁵ Whether this is indicative of an operational ICBM capability, however, is still subject to debate. Thus last March Hanson Baldwin, writing in *The New York Times*, said "hard evidence of Soviet capability of launching long-range missiles is still absent," and the same sentiments were echoed by Air Force Secretary Douglas in a speech in Washington in May.²⁶ However, in a statement to the Twenty-first Party Congress Khrushchev said that "serial production of intercontinental ballistic missiles has been organized," and Defense Minister Malinovsky stated that the Soviet's

intercontinental missiles "can carry their hydrogen warheads precisely to any point of the globe."²⁷ The implication in this statement that the Soviets had perfected a guidance system was strengthened by the observation of Dr. Von Braun that the Soviet cosmic probe indicated the existence of a guidance system accurate enough to place an ICBM on an American city.²⁸

Despite any doubts of Soviet ICBM capabilities, or perhaps because of them, the United States has officially conceded a lead in ICBM production to Russia, through Secretary McElroy's statement that "It is not our intention or policy to try to match missile for missile in the ICBM category the Russian capability in the next couple of years."²⁹ At the end of June the Secretary said that both the United States and the Soviet Union were lagging in their missile programs, but that he still expected the Russians to have 10 ICBM's by the end of this year.³⁰

It is this admitted disparity in ICBM's which has come to symbolize "the missile gap." According to the views of some critics of our military policy, such as retired Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, the Soviet Union has operational missiles at all useful ranges, while the United States has no operational ballistic missile between the 200 mile Redstone and the soon-to-be operational 1000 mile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). It is in these ranges, says the general, that the Soviets can blanket our allies in Europe, and in effect render our airbases and IRBM launching sites untenable.³¹

The implications of these criticisms are very grave, for they point to the bankruptcy of the deterrence policy. If the United States does not have the defensive capability to cope with Soviet missiles, and if at the same time the Soviet Union can neutralize our deterrent power, the Russians might well be

²⁴ See in the latter connection Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips (Ret.), "The Growing Missile Gap," January 8, 1957, p. 14.

²⁵ *New York Times*, February 8, 1959, p. E.

²⁶ *Ibid.* March 24, 1959, p. 14. See also *Washington Star*, May 16, 1959, p. 1.

²⁷ *New York Times*, February 8, 1959, *op. cit.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁹ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Aeronautics and Space Service. Missile and Space Activities Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 86th Congress. 1st Session. Washington, U.S. G.P.O. 1959, p. 46.

³⁰ *New York Times*, June 30, p. 1.

³¹ "The Growing Missile Gap," *The Reporter*, January 8, 1959, pp. 10-16, *op. cit.* and "Mr. McElroy's Maginot Line," *The Reporter*, February 19, 1959, pp. 25-26.

tempted to pursue an aggressive military action.

It is these criticisms which our government seeks to fend off with reference to our diversified striking force, that very diversification whose adequacy General Phillips and others have questioned. At the same time we are continuing our own program of missile development. The Army has developed the Redstone missile, a liquid-fueled rocket with a 200 mile range. The 1500 mile Jupiter IRBM was also developed under Army auspices. The Thor, with approximately the same range, was developed by the Air Force. Both of these missiles are in production, and Britain and Italy, among our allies, have agreed to accept American IRBM's for use by their forces.

The other missiles, the Atlas and the Titan, both Air Force developed, are America's current entries in the ICBM race. It is hoped that Atlas squadrons will be operational by the end of this year, while the Titan is expected to become operational in 1961.³² The range of the Atlas is 6,000 miles, while that of the Titan may cover as much as 9,000 miles, and in addition the Titan carries a heavier payload. Planned for the future is a more sophisticated missile, the Minuteman, which will be solid fueled, in contrast to its liquid fueled predecessors. It should take less time to launch the Minuteman, but it will not be able to carry the warhead of the Atlas and Titan. All of these weapons systems will depend for their effectiveness on trained personnel and the availability of proper launching sites. Present indications are that there will be a considerable time lag before men and bases are ready.

Finally there is the Polaris missile, already mentioned, designed to be fired from a submarine. Since the undersea craft which will carry this missile will be nuclear powered, its advantages of mobility and concealment should be enhanced. Polaris and Minuteman may well be our chief deterrent weapons of the future.

Problems of Arms Control

Whatever the comparative standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in the arms race, a race whose ramifications this article has barely brushed, many thoughtful people are convinced that such a race can

end only in disaster. In response to world uneasiness, the Western nations and the Soviet Union have been negotiating on the subject of disarmament ever since 1946. The basic problem, of course, has been the control of nuclear weapons. American policy consistently favored control of such weapons under an effective system of inspection, whereas for the first decade of negotiations the Soviet Union just as consistently called for the complete prohibition of their manufacture, stockpiling and use. During that period American proposals for inspection were broadened to cover the means of employing nuclear weapons in a surprise attack, inasmuch as inspection of production facilities alone was no longer considered adequate for their control.

The Soviet Union, in its turn, began to couple its "ban the bomb" slogan with a demand for a one-third cut in conventional armaments and forces. Such a demand was of course completely unacceptable to the West, as it would have nullified the one great military advantage it possessed, while at the same time confirming the predominant military position of the Soviet Union. Significantly, the Soviet Union did not abandon its demand for a total cessation of nuclear production until 1956, by which time it was claiming equality with and even superiority to the United States in the production of nuclear weapons.³³

The disarmament question is, of course, an ultra-complex one, and considerations of space preclude its extended treatment here. Suffice it to say that there have been a number of initiatives from the Western camp, including President Eisenhower's atoms for peace proposal in December, 1953, and the Open Skies Plan advanced at Geneva in 1955. There was the Anglo-French plan of 1956, which called for a declaration by the participating powers that they would consider themselves prohibited from using nuclear weapons except for defense against aggression, coupled with an arms freeze, and the institution of inspection procedures. A gradual arms reduction was to follow, and

³² *Washington Post and Times Herald*, May 10, 1959, p. A 12.

³³ For a good summary of the disarmament picture during the first postwar decade, see: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Control and Reduction of Armaments, A Decade of Negotiations, 1946-1956*. Staff Study No. 3. Committee Print, Subcommittee on Disarmament. 84th Congress. 2nd session. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1956. 22 pp.

finally there would be the restriction and the eventual ending of nuclear testing. This restriction on nuclear testing has been the prime ingredient in the various Soviet disarmament proposals for the past few years.

But the possibilities for disarmament, now as in previous eras, are conditioned by the state of technology and the climate of international confidence. Unfortunately, as the state of the nuclear art has grown more and more complex, the chances for overall disarmament have diminished, for the nuclear powers are reluctant to agree to conditions which may be technologically invalid a short time later. Currently, disarmament negotiations are confined to the question of a nuclear test ban, and their success or failure hinges to a considerable degree on whether the Soviet Union will accept the American contention that the scientists of East and West erred in their 1958 evaluation of the possibilities of detecting underground atomic and thermonuclear blasts. We now believe that some of these tests may escape detection. The Soviet Union has chosen to treat this contention with great indignation as a shabby maneuver aimed at breaking up the disarmament talks.

This Soviet reaction is illustrative of that

deep-rooted mutual suspicion of East and West which has characterized world conditions since shortly after the end of World War II. It is because of this suspicion, plus, it must be added, the proven record of Soviet aggressiveness, that chances for disarmament currently appear so slight. While lack of confidence remains so complete, even the slightest reduction in conventional arms may appear too risky. With so much at stake in the cold war, both sides feel they cannot permit the slightest miscalculation, lest their security, in this nuclear-missile age, be breached permanently.

Finally, this is no longer the 1920's. Neither the American people nor their government believe we can lay the spectre of war merely by signing an agreement, no matter how well meaning or platitudinous. Under these conditions an overall disarmament agreement appears a virtual impossibility. Instead, some form of arms competition is likely to remain part of the international scene for the foreseeable future. To the extent that limited disarmament occurs, we hope that it will aid in the creation of that climate of confidence which is a necessary prerequisite to any substantial arms reduction.

(Continued from page 197)

Russia is a victorious nation, victorious beyond anyone's expectations, including her own in 1939. Russia has at present more than enough *Lebensraum* and years of hard work ahead of her, to reach the standard of living not of the United States, but that which Germany had reached before Hitler. There is no reason to expect Khrushchev to act as Hitler acted. And there is one more fundamental difference: in the 1930's Britain and the United States were disarmed and the United States had a disastrous neutrality legislation. At present, and that will be true for the future, the United States and Britain are united and are well armed.

Third: it is a great mistake to explain the revolutionary changes going on in the whole world *sub specie Communismi*. That gives much too much credit to communism and plays into its hands. Unrest in Cuba and Algeria is due to conditions in those coun-

tries, not to Communist influence. The leaders are inspired by the ideas of 1789 and by the example of the United States. Fifty years ago labor unrest in this country was attributed to "agitators," who were called anarchists or Communists according to the fashion of the times. The labor unrest ceased because the conditions which caused it fundamentally changed. United States foreign policy has to support, as far as it can, a similar change of conditions everywhere. It will thereby strengthen the Western cause and its own national security. The West, and not communism, is the advocate of human liberty and dignity, of self-government and equal justice for all. It must reassert its leadership in these fields, at least as much as in those of armaments and technology. The over-estimation of sputniks is characteristic of Communist mentality. The realization of human rights is the strong and unique Western weapon.

Partly because of other cold war considerations, "China has harassed American diplomacy in this century far beyond its importance to the United States." Because of the United States commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and refusal to accept the principle of two Chinas, the Administration faces a continuing crisis in the Far East, where "American policy . . . has been worn threadbare."

The China Illusion

By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

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NOWHERE has the cold war imposed on American foreign policy alternatives as unfortunate and as potentially disastrous as on the question of Quemoy and Matsu. It seems incongruous that this nation should find itself repeatedly at the brink of war over the defense of these tiny islands hugging the China coast ten thousand miles away. Certainly they have no more bearing on the strategic security of the United States than does Staten Island in New York harbor to Russia. No one—not even the spokesmen of the administration—insist that these islands are vital to the defense of the free world. Yet the United States has become so thoroughly committed to their defense that it has threatened atomic war to maintain them.

This incongruity has resulted from policies that have no precedent in American diplomatic experience. On matters of China this nation has confused its strategic interests with its commitment to a regime—that of Chiang Kai-shek. Traditionally a nation's foreign commitments are restricted to areas on a

map. They are made to other countries, not to specific regimes or men. In this respect the commitment of the United States to Japan or the Philippine Islands is historic, sound and understandable. These commitments are maintained because the areas involved appear essential to the protection of American security interests in the Far East. They produce neither conflict nor tension.

Normally the American commitment to Formosa would be equally clear and acceptable. If it were purely strategic, the strange involvement of the United States in the Formosan Straits would evaporate. Few statesmen of Europe criticize this nation's strategic interest in Formosa. Its significance to the American defense perimeter in the western Pacific is obvious. If Asians oppose even this commitment, it is because they distrust all free world defenses outside Europe. But what embarrasses United States policy is that the American interest in Formosa transcends the island itself and includes the Chiang regime on that island. It is this dual involvement that forces an ambivalent position toward Quemoy and Matsu.

Congress in the Formosan Resolution of January, 1955, authorized the President to defend the offshore islands if it appeared that any attack on them would be preliminary to an attack on Formosa itself, lying 130 miles from the China coast. This resolution, unfortunately, confused the issue of Chinese purpose with Chinese power. Certainly the mainland regime in any conflict would do what it had the power to do. Thus the question is not what the mainland Chinese want,

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but what the United States can feasibly prevent them from achieving. If they desire Formosa, as they insist, it is because they regard it a threat to their security. If the island, thousands of miles from American shores, is important strategically to the United States, it must comprise some threat to the mainland. Especially is this true since it is the residence of the man who has devoted his life to recovering control of all China.

Strategically, there is little connection between the offshore islands and Formosa. If the protection of Formosa is well within the capabilities of American naval and air power, the same is not true for Quemoy and Matsu. The defense of the offshore islands is not maintained because of their importance in strategic planning, but because of the commitment to Chiang. The Kuomintang is a government in exile. Without hope of return to the mainland, Chiang admits, it would disintegrate. The offshore islands are symbols of his return; they represent stepping stones to the mainland. The United States, committed to the perpetuation of the Republic of China, has no choice but to defend Chiang's forward position on Quemoy and Matsu. It is not the strength, but the weakness, of the Kuomintang that forces the administration to accept its commitments in the Formosan Straits. It cannot defend the offshore islands at any cost commensurate with their value; it cannot declare them beyond the American defense perimeter without endangering Chiang's regime and the nation's entire China policy.

Nonrecognition

China has harassed American diplomacy in this century far beyond its importance to the United States. As early as the turn of the century this nation identified its interests in the Orient with the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China. During the 1930's the American interest in China was broadened to include Chiang Kai-shek as its leader. This burdened the United States with a dual obligation that it could maintain only with difficulty in the face of Japanese aggression. China itself was a power vacuum in 1941, and it was doubtful if Chiang had more than nominal control even of that vacuum. If the United States could save him from the Japa-

nese, it was doubtful if it could save him from his internal enemies, the Chinese communists. But the war in the Pacific merely confirmed the American attachment to Chiang as the man who would stabilize China and make that nation the foundation of a new balance in the Far East.

Chiang's exile to Formosa in 1949 confronted the United States with a hard decision. Everything relative to China had changed. Whatever the quality of their ideas, policies or methods, the Chinese communists had captured the imagination of the bulk of the Chinese people and were in a position to solidify their control over the nation. Chiang had been rejected and would not return to the mainland except as the result of a general war in which American power alone removed his enemies. These were the realities in the power struggle within China at mid-century.

But these events were no barrier to those who were determined to anchor America's future in the Orient to the Chinese government in exile. The slow collapse of the Kuomintang after 1945 left sufficient doubt as to the efficacy of American policy to permit those who had emotional and economic ties to Chiang (as well as those politicians who found suddenly in the China question an effective weapon to club the Truman administration) to pin the Red successes on armed aggression, backed by Moscow, which the United States from weakness, stupidity or treason refused to halt. What delivered China to the Communists, wrote Freda Uteley in *The China Story*, was

ignorance, refusal to face facts, romanticism, and political immaturity or a misguided humanitarianism, and the influence of Communist sympathizers and the careerists who staked their reputation on a pro-Soviet policy.

Thus the myth of Chiang's strength and popularity on the mainland was perpetuated. But since this was neither an explanation of what had occurred nor a realistic appraisal of the sources of power in China, any policy based on the assumption that Chiang could be returned to the mainland at small cost would lead to embarrassment and continued failure. Much of the attack on American China policy was valid enough, but when it denied the existence of a fundamental revolution in China which had upset the Kuomin-

tang, it anchored American objectives to what no power could achieve. Yet so successful was the defense of Chiang in the United States that eventually his supporters were able to force the removal of those both in China and in the State Department who supposedly were responsible for Chiang's fall. Even tearing up much of the foreign service did not seem too high a price to prove the legitimacy of the Chinese government on Formosa.

Expense of Nonrecognition

But the cost of building policy on the assumption of Chiang's superior claims to power over China began to mount. The refusal of the United States to recognize the new Peking regime forced it to deny its long-standing tradition of recognizing established governments. Nonrecognition was, as Quincy Wright pointed out in the March, 1958, issue of *Current History*, contrary to the normal expectation of international law. It forced the United States into the unfortunate position of choosing between decisions based on abstract moral judgment and decisions based on its traditional respect for international law and political negotiation. John Foster Dulles warned in 1950 that the Assembly of the United Nations, if it would serve the cause of peace, must be representative of the world as it is and not include only those portions of which the United States approved. He suggested that this nation accept all others without attempting to separate the "good" from the "bad." Then he added: "If the Communist government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations." But under the continued pressure of those who anticipated the return of Chiang to power, the Truman administration reluctantly adopted the seldom-applied doctrine that recognition implies approval.

American policy quickly exacted another price in the weakening of free world unity in the Pacific. It has antagonized both the allies of Europe and the neutrals of Asia. For a decade it has neither made friends nor influenced anyone to the righteousness of its cause, for the world has no interest in the return of Chiang. Early in his administration President Eisenhower expressed uneasiness

over American policy toward China in meetings of his staff and Republican leaders. Robert J. Donovan, in his semi-official history of the administration, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, recorded the President's views in the following passage:

The President was not convinced that the vital interests of the United States were best served by prolonged nonrecognition of China. He had serious doubts as to whether Russia and China were natural allies. . . . Therefore, he asked, would it not be the best policy in the long run for the United States to try to pull China away from Russia rather than drive the Chinese ever deeper into an unnatural alliance unfriendly to the United States? Likewise the problem of keeping the Japanese economy alive weighed heavily upon him, and he felt that in part at least its solution must lie ultimately in trade between Japan and China. The alternative, he feared, would be endless subsidization of the Japanese economy by the American taxpayer.

But never in his public statements did the President breathe a word of doubt relative to the policy of nonrecognition. If he favored a new China policy, the intense antipathy toward Red China which had been created by the friends of Chiang prompted him to maintain the uncompromising posture toward the Peking regime.

Policy which is not anchored to the realities of power must falter in every crisis. American policy toward China would, therefore, deceive not only those Americans who anticipated an early and inexpensive return of Chiang to the mainland, but also the Chinese Nationalists themselves. It would lead to bold attitudes and last-minute concessions, as in the threats of massive retaliation in both Korea and Indochina. Perhaps the full price of attaching policy to myth was paid in the futile gesture of "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek in 1953, and in the Geneva Conference of May, 1954, when the nation could employ neither force nor diplomacy in the Indochina crisis, so completely had it ignored the factors of ends and means in policy.

Not even this evidence of failure produced any alteration in official American policy. At San Francisco in June, 1957, Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State, again placed extreme confidence in the moral power of the United States to alter or destroy the Red regime. American policy, he said, is based on "a belief in the future of human freedom," and on the

assumption that "international Communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China, as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase." It was the intention of the United States to speed that passing. Recognition and trade with China would, he said, merely strengthen Peking in its opposition to the United States. American policy must be anchored to principle. "If Communism is stubborn for the wrong," he added, "let us be steadfast for the right." Any weakening of American policy toward continental China would discourage both the anti-Communist elements on the mainland and the many overseas Chinese, would destroy the resistance of the non-Communist countries of southeast Asia to Chinese pressure, would break American pledges to the Nationalists on Formosa, and would lead, if the Peking regime were admitted, to a disruption of the United Nations.

None of these rationalizations of American China policy escaped the thrusts of statesmen and scholars of the United States, Europe and Asia. The Afro-Asian bloc revealed its bitterness toward such views at the Bandung Conference of April, 1955. Red China has been coming into her own diplomatically. If this nation's moral purpose has not driven back the Bamboo Curtain, it is because the cost would be high and because the world has no sympathy with such purpose. No longer is recognition itself a diplomatic weapon for the simple reason that American nonrecognition is to the Chinese no great source of insecurity. For a decade this nation has demonstrated that its purpose for China is based on principle, not policy. When demands persistently exceed what a nation can achieve, any bargaining power which they once commanded gradually diminishes as their hollowness is demonstrated in crisis after crisis. Edmund Burke once observed that one art of statesmanship is to grant graciously what ultimately cannot be denied.

Mr. Dulles at a news conference in May, 1958, demonstrated the extent to which the Eisenhower administration has defied the traditions of the United States in its continued emphasis on nonrecognition. He declared that "one of the cardinal doctrines for this hemisphere, which is affirmed and reaffirmed on every occasion by the American Republics, is the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries." He

pointed out that "if we tried to deal with these governments on the basis of our appraisal as to whether they were a good government or a bad government . . . we would find ourselves . . . deeply enmeshed in their internal affairs." He concluded:

It is obvious the American Government and the American nation and the American people like to see governments which rest upon the consent of the governed and where the governed are educated people able to carry the responsibilities of self-government. Wherever that exists, there almost automatically results a closer and more intimate friendly relationship than where that doesn't exist. But any formula whereby we try to apply a sort of slide rule to their governments would be in fact an interference in their internal affairs.

The Quemoy Crisis

When American leadership made the decision to remain involved in Chiang's struggle for power, it was only a matter of time before that involvement would lead to embarrassment. When the Chinese Reds threatened Formosa in January, 1955, Mr. Dulles assured Chiang that the Nationalists would not "stand alone" against any invasion from the mainland. Thereafter there was no escape for the United States from any renewal of the China civil war.

Herein the nation was breaking a cardinal rule of diplomacy. Any Chinese assault on Chiang's exposed position would leave the United States with two alternatives, neither of which would wholly serve this nation's interest. If American forces rushed to the aid of Quemoy and Matsu, the United States would be involved in another open conflict with China; if, as Mr. Dulles warned, the United States used atomic bombs, the result might be general war. If the United States backed down and deserted Chiang, as it did in the Tachens, it would suffer another tremendous loss of prestige. The secret of successful diplomacy has always entailed the avoidance of the hard decision between war and diplomatic defeat. Yet any all-out Chinese attack on the offshore islands would place the United States in exactly that dilemma. The situation became increasingly tense as the Red Chinese slowly massed guns and planes in the vicinity of Quemoy and built new rail lines to supply the new airfields.

Admiral Felix Stump, commander of all American forces in the Pacific, warned in the summer of 1957 that the situation along the China coast was more ominous than at any time since the start of the Korean war.

It required only the shelling of Quemoy in August, 1958, to create a major crisis and reveal the full irony of the American position. The administration had lost the power of decision, for it could not choose between war and the desertion of Chiang's regime. Unless the United States were willing to concede the offshore islands, it was within the power of the two Chinese factions to determine when and where the United States would become involved. Any assault on the offshore islands would force its hand.

Mr. Dulles looked on in total disbelief. Certainly, he said, the Reds would not attempt to take the islands. He warned them that the United States was bound by treaty to the Nationalists, and that any attack would threaten the peace of the area and would be "highly hazardous" for the Chinese. He declared that the United States was ready with nuclear weapons. But he was careful not to commit the United States to the defense of Quemoy. This, he said, would depend upon the President's interpretation of the attack—whether it appeared to be the first step in an assault on Formosa itself.

In the crisis Mr. Dulles applied the doctrine that the United States would not recognize any change emanating from force. Yet in his own book, *War, Peace, and Change*, published in the late 1930's, he had written:

For a nation to base its relations with the outside world on the assumption that change brought about by force is in fact non-existent is a policy of absurdity. . . . For any nation to close its eyes to such changes, and to treat them as non-existent, means the election of such nation to live in a world as unrelated to reality as that of Alice in Wonderland.

In the Quemoy episode, however, the Secretary accepted the sweeping and unrealistic principle that change must come peacefully. How this could be accomplished is not clear.

President Eisenhower in his nationwide televised address assumed an ambivalent position as the American dilemma required. His assurance to the nation was complete: "There is not going to be any appeasement. I believe that there is not going to be any

war." He promised that no American boy would die over Quemoy and that there would be no Munichs. He defended the commitment to Quemoy by declaring that the Chinese designs on the offshore islands were part of a general plan to liquidate the entire Western position in the Far East, but he added that an agreement on the offshore island could terminate the conflict. The message divided the American people into tidy groupings. Those who favored holding Quemoy were for peace, freedom and justice; those who favored ceding the islands were appeasers. The United States would not retreat, he assured the nation, adding that he would not make "absolute advance commitments, but . . . use [his] judgment according to the circumstances of the time."

Americans who accepted the view that the issue of Formosa and the offshore islands were one upheld the President's address. *Life* lauded the President for the firmness and clarity of his stand. Whatever the vulnerability of Quemoy to attack from the mainland, the United States had an obligation to Chiang that could not be compromised. Senator William F. Knowland of California termed the speech "a forceful reminder to Communist aggressors that America will not abandon her allies or defenses in the Far East."

To Europeans and Americans who could detect no strategic relationship between Formosa and the offshore islands it appeared ridiculous for the President to go to the brink over a sand bar well within the harbor of Amoy. John S. Knight, editor of the *Chicago Daily News*, commented: "Let's protect Formosa, as we have pledged. But defense of Quemoy and Matsu by United States forces would be an act of monumental madness." Dean Acheson accused the administration of pursuing a policy designed to keep everybody guessing because it had "unwisely maneuvered itself, with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, into a situation of which it [had] lost control."

Europe was visibly shaken by the crisis. Its leading spokesmen and editors denied the relationship between Munich and Quemoy, and they wondered why the United States would expose itself to war for the fiction that Chiang could recapture the mainland. *Le Monde* (Paris) declared that "it would be

unbelievable for a world conflict to arise from the contest." Europeans favored concessions; to them China was no threat. American correspondents seemed to agree that American attitudes toward China, amid the dangers of nuclear war, were undermining this nation's influence in Europe.

The New Symbolism

Throughout the Quemoy crisis of 1958 it was quite evident that Chiang Kai-shek was the controlling factor in American action. The constant pressure from Taipei rendered the negotiations at Warsaw, Poland, between Ambassador Jacob D. Beam and the Red Chinese envoy, Wang Ping-nan, hopeless from the beginning. There was no possible formula that would satisfy Chiang and still reduce the American commitment to the offshore islands. Mr. Dulles declared in advance that the United States would agree to no settlement that injured the Nationalist regime. That ruled out any concessions. When in October the President and the Secretary suggested partial demilitarization of the offshore islands as a basis for negotiation, Chiang declared that he would ignore any agreement at Warsaw that weakened his position toward the mainland.

Chiang's belligerence forced the Secretary to fly to Taipei to reach some new *modus vivendi* with the Nationalist leader. The final agreement did not impair Chiang's position on the offshore islands, but it changed the symbolism. The restoration of freedom on the mainland was still the sacred mission of the Kuomintang, but the power to be employed was now to be purely moral rather than military. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, announced that these islands would never "be selected as bases from which to attack the mainland." The communiqué restated the American position: "The United States recognizes that the Republic of China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations entertained by the great mass of the Chinese people. . . . The foundation of this mission resides in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people." Thus the mission could be achieved without force. But the crucial issue of what the United States would do if the mainland Chinese assaulted the outposts remained the unanswered challenge.

Unfortunately neither the Kuomintang nor the mainland Chinese want the United States to escape its dilemma. Only by forcing Chiang to withdraw his troops from Quemoy and Matsu and gaining Allied support for the commitment to Formosa could this nation reduce the hazards of its alliance to Chiang. But this would establish the principle of the two Chinas which neither Chinese antagonist wants. Chiang must remain on the offshore islands to keep alive his hope for the future. Since the Reds cannot annex Formosa through invasion, they can keep the Formosan issue critical only through exerting pressure on Chiang at the offshore islands. Perhaps the desire to perpetuate the Chinese civil war was a more important motivation than American military threats in preventing a Red assault on the Nationalist offshore positions. But whatever the motivation, the Red decision permitted the Eisenhower administration to weather the crisis without altering its commitments or facing their consequences.

American policy toward China has been worn threadbare. It is true that a great nation can move through crisis after crisis without budging from its demands. But the fact that a crisis has been passed without granting any concessions does not necessarily constitute a tangible gain. The issues, if not resolved, remain to trouble the peace again, and there is the danger that when they are revived they must be faced from an ever-weakening diplomatic position. "Has not the time come," asked the London *Observer* in July, 1957, "for the Administration to see the picture as a whole and to move boldly to bring policy in line with realities?"

Privately the fiction that Chiang will "liberate" the mainland has been buried even in the Administration. But the constant repetition of the myth of Chiang's power and virtue has created a public sentiment, rooted in unreality, that has in itself become an obstacle to statesmanship. Perhaps the time for attempted recognition has not arrived. But the time has long passed for American leadership to bring some balance between ends and means to China policy—to admit that the destiny of China rests not in the Kuomintang but in the vast complexities of the mainland.

How has the Soviet-American rivalry been reflected in the United Nations? "The patterns of confrontation and moral crusade which have characterized U.N. activities in the cold war rivalry have tended to identify the organization as an instrument of national policy, with its virtues and shortcomings largely measured in terms of its effectiveness in the Great Power struggle," writes this specialist. But the position of the U.N. is changing, he notes, and today "the United Nations has emerged from the polarities of cold war rivalry in a Western-dominated organization to the diffusion of differing rivalries in an organization no longer dominated by the West."

The United Nations and the Cold War Conflict

BY ROSS N. BERKES

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IT WOULD be foolish to deny that the cold war has had a great impact on the United Nations, although one might question whether its prosecution through the United Nations has brought much more than negative victories for either side. In one sense, the cold war has probably harmed the United Nations, for it has tended to focus American conceptions of the organization almost exclusively in terms of its usefulness vis-a-vis the Communist world. Our disappointments have been easily viewed as chargeable not only to the iniquity of the Soviet world, but also to the impotence of the United Nations. In our tendency to see the United Nations as a place where nations Stand and Are Counted, we are subjected to a double despair: first, that some will not

stand; and second, that the rewards of standing on cold war issues are so meager.

Part of the price we have paid for all of this has been to put a premium on showmanship—headline-catching by apt retort. The ultimate sterility of such verbal duels is offset largely by the art in their drama. On this plane, perhaps more than any other in the cold war, we have had satisfaction, for in reality the Communist delegate is seldom skillful in debate. Here, then, lies temptation, and some of the reasons why—despite the ultimate disappointments mentioned above—we have not been averse to fighting the cold war in the United Nations. The causes have been satisfyingly moral, the voting tests by and large have been comforting, and the verbal matches have had a natural appeal. The temptation has been further entrenched by the assumption that not even the Communist world is impervious to moral suasion.

The United Nations has been geared to engage more effectively in the cold war by augmenting the role of the General Assembly. This was achieved largely through American initiative, and is symbolized by the invention in 1947 of the Little Assembly, and by the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950. Both devices encouraged the General Assembly to take up issues that the Security Council—due to Soviet vetoes or their threat—could not pursue. It was during this period, 1947–1950, and

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when two-thirds of the U.N. membership had grown to only 40 votes, that American-backed resolutions in the General Assembly took on the appearance of "automatic majorities." On cold war issues, General Assembly votes in these days were on the order of 42-8—an imbalance which, with the addition of 6 abstentions, was precisely the vote in 1950 on the key resolution in the first of nine annual rounds (to date) on the Chinese representation dispute. It was this United Nations, stabilized at 60 members in the five-year period from 1950 to 1955, and dominated throughout by the Korean War or its bitter memories, that in so many ways was captured by the cold war, and was transformed into an instrument of policy in the American struggle against the Communist World.

Using the Security Council

The involvement of the United Nations in the cold war rivalry was apparent from the outset, although the term was not a familiar one at the time. Soviet initiative in making use of the Security Council formed a pattern centering around demands for the immediate withdrawal of Western troops from far-flung territories just emerging from the war. Indeed, the first year of the Security Council was so cluttered with disputes brought in by the Soviet world or involving the Soviet world that there was adequate justification for the complaint of the British representative that this most critical organ was being asked to rush from one crisis to another before it had even developed its rules of procedure. While not all of the disputes during this early period were introduced by the Communist bloc, none was introduced by any of the other Permanent Members. Moreover, it was soon clear—as indicated in the Greek case—that Security Council efforts to investigate charges against Communist powers developed into wild affairs of diverting counter-accusation and counter-investigation.

Thus commenced the period of intense focus on the Security Council and its cold war dramas, a period accompanied by mounting concern over Soviet abuse of the "veto." Our preoccupation with Soviet vetoes—which, by 1950, numbered in the forties, and has since just about doubled,

despite the decline of business before that organ—has not been particularly perceptive. It has assumed that the effectiveness of the pacific settlement function of the United Nations—even of its coercive and investigative activities—would somehow be transformed by stricter limitation of the Great Powers' right of veto. Beyond its present capacities, just what the machinery of the United Nations could have hoped to achieve is best understood by a hard look at the potentialities and limitation of the General Assembly, and these are hardly more or less than a veto-less Security Council could have accomplished in affecting the course of Soviet behavior or in despatching problems caught in the vortex of the Soviet-Western rivalry.

Using the General Assembly

It has been presented, perhaps too casually, that the cold war was introduced into the United Nations largely through Soviet initiative. The Security Council was used in the interest of advancing Communist goals at the expense of the Western powers to enhance the creation of power vacuums, as in Indonesia, in Greece, and, indirectly, in Syria and Lebanon. In contrast to the early Security Council, the First Session of the General Assembly was comparatively free of Soviet initiative, obstructionism or even propaganda. One particular exception stands out, and that was the Soviet effort to repeat in the General Assembly its effort to hasten the withdrawal of allied military forces from all territories other than those of an ex-enemy. Except for disarmament, which in its first postwar stages falls into a somewhat more ambiguous category,¹ the patterns of cold war rivalry that grew to familiarity in the first decade of the United Nations were neither set nor quickly recognizable. These patterns emerged more clearly in 1947, and persisted for nearly a decade.

The disarmament quarrel, which was an acute Great Power problem from the outset, became a prime cold war issue in time, although one might question whether in the beginning any power but the Soviet Union thought of its cold war aspects. In the Soviet case, the Western atomic energy proposals could well have been regarded as the one

¹ See also the article by Allan Nanes in this issue.

subject of U.N. business where an uncertain mixture of naiveté, cunning and monolithic determination on the part of the West constituted a primary threat.

The period and subject of the Baruch Plan revealed Soviet diplomatic skill at one of its lowest ebbs, and one not recouped until Vishinsky took hold more firmly in 1949. It has been remarked before, and bears repeating here, that the oft-appearing woodenness of Soviet negotiators may be as much the product of a gross system defectiveness as of simple bull-headedness. Certainly the Soviet delegates to the U.N. have occasionally appeared bewildered and uncomfortable over the pace and techniques of skilled Western negotiators. This was particularly true, almost classically so, during the unfolding of Western proposals on atomic energy control. To the Soviet delegates, in this 1946-1948 period, it must have been the dictate of prudence to evade rather than to confront the complex and shifting aspects of the Western proposals on atomic energy control.

Whatever their inherent villainy, and perhaps even more because of it, Soviet leaders and delegates must have been impressed by the dramatic offensive unleashed upon them by Bernard Baruch. His speeches were seldom less than oracular, and his emphasis on "condign punishment" and freedom from the veto offered what well might have appeared as a neat highway to disaster for the Soviet world as long as the West held an atomic monopoly.

The U.N. and Korea

As for American initiative in bringing the cold war into the United Nations, 1947 and the Korean question may be the most realistic date and subject. The failure of American-Soviet negotiations for the establishment of an independent and united Korea, a particularly frustrating revelation of Soviet behavior, was brought straight to the General Assembly by the United States at the outset of the Second Session. The subsequent passage of an American-sponsored draft resolution, calling for free elections in both Korean zones, was accomplished in terms of a 43-0-6 vote—the Soviet bloc refusing to participate in the voting, except to abstain. This and the Greek question, which had been shifted by the West to the General Assembly

after a series of Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, brought the General Assembly well into the main stream of international politics. They also brought the Assembly rather forcefully into the cold war.

It was this Second Session of the General Assembly, late in 1947, that invented the Interim Committee, or Little Assembly, to which the Soviet Union objected violently on the grounds that it was a device to circumvent the rule of unanimity in the Security Council. This was also the Session that invoked a hard look at the barrage of Soviet vetoes in the Security Council—thirteen in five months, although over half of them were on membership applications. Further, it was the Session that pulled a reluctant World Court into the cold war by requesting an Advisory Opinion on what in essence was the legitimacy of Soviet behavior on membership application questions. Characteristically, the Soviet reaction to the Opinion was a disdainful denial of the Court's right to interpret the Charter.

Using the World Court

Continued Western frustration over the membership question led the West later to invoke the Court for a second Advisory Opinion on substantially the same question. Although the Court again performed in a manner pleasing to the West, it registered in addition its annoyance at being used as a pawn in the cold war. The implication was clear: the Court resented being asked to respond, not so much for the legal guidance it could give, but rather for the political capital to be made from such legal guidance. Perhaps it would be wise to emphasize this, for one of the problems of the cold war has been that of the role of self-restraint.

For nearly all of the turbulent decade following the pattern-setting 1947 Session of the General Assembly, a Western majority busily set about rehabilitating and using the United Nations for the grim purposes of cold war rivalry. The Soviet role seldom rose above braking or counterpunching actions, however viciously undertaken. The one persistent Soviet offensive throughout this period in the United Nations was on disarmament. This centered around an annual ritual, variously introduced as an Assembly agenda item under such ponderous headings as "Mea-

asures to Avert the Threat of a New World War and to Reduce Tensions in International Relations." The welcome given to this Soviet gambit by Ambassador Lodge during the 1953 Session bears repeating, and went as follows:

For the benefit of those representatives who have not been here before this year, it may be useful to explain that the item before the General Assembly is that hardy perennial called the "Soviet item." It is purely a propaganda proposition, not introduced with a serious purpose of serious action, but solely as a peg on which to hang a number of speeches with a view to getting them into the press of the world.

Among the subjects usually typifying the "Soviet item" were prohibition of mass destruction weapons, reduction of Great Power military forces, elimination of foreign military bases and condemnation of war propaganda. Usually loaded with unrestrained invective against the West in general and the United States in particular, Soviet and satellite delegates indulged in their orgies and offered their draft resolutions in fits of reckless abandon.

Surely there is something symbolic and even frightening represented here, for the "Soviet item" was never better than childish and grotesque, and in its annual history it seldom escaped from smothering its own potentialities for damaging the West. Why any power would repeatedly offer propaganda dressed in the unmistakable garb of propaganda, would repeatedly discredit its own case, and would repeatedly fail to see how half-way intelligent packaging of its propositions could have vastly increased their marketability, remains puzzling and even disturbing. For if it is axiomatic that one should never underrate the enemy, it is occasionally tempting—as in this context—to regard Communists as fools.

Chinese Representation

One of the big cold war opportunities offered to the Soviet Union in the United Nations has been the Chinese representation issue, an opportunity dominated at the very outset by the tactics of coercion. Just why Soviet delegations dramatically walked out of U.N. bodies, when these failed to seat the representatives of the Communist regime during the half-year prior to the outbreak of

the Korean War, is a question that leaves room for some rather intriguing possibilities.

Perhaps the Soviet Union wanted to capitalize on what it considered was a sure thing, thereby taking credit for a cold war triumph. Perhaps it wanted to build Western resistance, thereby widening the gap between Asian countries and the West. Perhaps it was even eager to welcome the consequences of defeat, thus adding to the discredit of the United Nations as a tool of the Western powers. It would seem, in any case, that this subject, and that of banning atomic war, have been the two most manageable issues in the Soviet pursuit of the cold war through the United Nations. Otherwise, and particularly in the light of the rather circumspect Soviet restraint on Middle East questions brought to the United Nations, one might conclude that as a cold war vehicle, the United Nations generally has not been favored by the Soviet Union.

Turning to the other side of the cold war, range and versatility in making use of the United Nations have been obviously more apparent. The era of Western dominance in the United Nations provides its own rationale for this, symbolized as it was by the mechanics of Security Council voting, where the veto could be transformed into an ugly word to mark its user, and where it was seldom a practical possibility for any power other than the Soviet Union even to register a veto. There was a period when some of the friendliest powers felt American policy was tempted to indulge too often in what seemed to be a game of luring out and wracking up Soviet vetoes. Whatever the purposefulness of this, the mechanics of Security Council voting became a prime means of documenting Western charges of Soviet abuse in the United Nations. Indeed, only recently has it become fashionable to study what the Soviet Union did not veto in the Security Council—a pursuit that has been rather thought-provoking.

The Western Offensive

Perhaps the most persistent theme in the Western cold war offensive in the United Nations has been that of human rights. The Mindszenty case and other human rights issues involving the East European satellites were swept into the Third, Fourth and Fifth

Sessions of the General Assembly on a wave of moral indignation. There was a great deal more to this than the venting of justifiable outrage, or even the rallying of world protest, for there was also a monumental effort on the part of the West to probe the instruments of intervention in the United Nations.

The forced labor investigations of the 1953-1954 period were of a different order, in that they represented a calculated Western offensive to bring to light the viciousness of Communist systems, but without the usual impetus of a particular crisis to launch the offensive. The cold war nature of the inquiry was indicated by the ad hoc committee's zest and resourcefulness in constructing a damaging case against the Soviet Union and Communist China, as contrasted with a noticeable disinterest in the possibility of such abuses in other countries.

It was in this same period, and in the wake of the Korean War, that American tactics in accusatory offensives against the Communist world took on a new characteristic—one which reappeared in a sequel to the 1956 Hungarian crisis. The change had to do with the construction of condemnatory resolutions in the General Assembly, a change which reflected a growing resistance on the part of those states less firmly committed in the cold war to the unpalatable alternatives being offered them by the West. Instead of asking such powers to join in condemning the Soviet Union or Communist China for palpable outrages, the West asked only that the deeds be condemned. Illustrative of this tactic was the resolution in the 1953 Session on "Atrocities Committed by North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces Against U.N. Prisoners of War in Korea."

During the Hungarian crisis late in 1956 such nuances had no appeal to the West, and the barrage of General Assembly resolutions was well-studded with direct condemnation. Ten months later, however, the Assembly debate on the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary brought the United States to propose a resolution reminiscent of the Korean Atrocities resolution of 1953. As Ambassador Lodge explained the condemnatory clause:

In it the Assembly condemns the acts already referred to. I submit that if we are to uphold

the basic principles of the Charter, we can do no less than to condemn these evil actions. There is nothing destructive about condemning evil. We do not condemn the doer but the deed. We approach the doer in a spirit of constructive hope.

Such fine distinctions may or may not have affected the vote, and yet it is tempting to note that whereas the condemnatory resolutions on Hungary at the height of the crisis were on the order of 55-10-14, the sequel vote on the "deed-not-doer" resolution was 60-10-10.

The German Issue

As a final illustration, the German reunification issue was brought to the General Assembly by the West late in 1951, and became a rather classic example of Western strategy in invoking the United Nations on cold war problems. The proposal put forward was to appoint a commission to determine if existing conditions in East and West Germany would make free elections possible. Violent opposition to the proposal from the Communist powers, including the views of an East German representative, made it clear that such a commission would not get inside East Germany. While this impasse hardly surprised the Western powers, it did not discourage them from pursuing the proposal, for as the American representative argued:

The General Assembly's authority came not from its power to coerce but from its power to recommend, the power to set an international standard of conduct against which actions could be judged by the people of the world. If it refused to exercise that power from fear that its recommendations would not be followed, it would be abdicating its moral responsibility and casting aside an opportunity to raise the standards of conduct of nations. The Assembly should set up the commission because that was the reasonable and right thing to do.

The resolution passed by a vote of 45-6-8, thereby placing the moral authority of the United Nations behind the principle of free elections in the solution of the German reunification question. As in the Korean case, the practical veto of Soviet resistance could not deprive the West of its goal of placing the United Nations firmly behind its propositions in the cold war struggle.

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How important is Soviet penetration in the underdeveloped areas? As this specialist sees it, the Soviet Union is "an antagonist to be reckoned with in the underdeveloped world. . . . Through a massive program of aid, trade and technical assistance, and open support in the United Nations of issues deemed vital by the uncommitted countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia, the Kremlin seeks to maximize its political influence, alienate the underdeveloped world from the West, and facilitate the coveted communization of these areas."

Economic Competition in the Underdeveloped Areas

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IRONICALLY enough the greatest challenge to American foreign policy exists in those areas where the military threat of the Soviet Union is least in evidence—in the vast areas of Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. In these backward, poverty-stricken, politically weak, and socially stagnant societies, resentment is smoldering and spreading against a way of life no longer regarded as inevitable; increasingly these societies are turning to extremist solutions inimical to Western interests. A xenophobic nationalism dominates the underdeveloped world. This phenomenon has been further complicated by the remarkable success with which the Soviet Union has intruded itself into the politics of the area since the death of Stalin in 1953, and most particularly since 1955.

Indeed, only communism seems to offer a comprehensive explanation for past poverty and present weakness, as well as a deceptively simple pattern for future development.

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It remains for the West to counterpose another set of alternatives. Whether it can do so effectively, whether it can overcome the bitter heritage of colonial rule, and whether it has the determination to promote in time the economic and political development of these nations along basically democratic lines remain unanswered questions.

The newly independent nations are not unaware of the dangers posed by Communist parties. But under the pressure of domestic politics and the impress of prejudices engendered by their former colonial bondage, they are obliged to avoid any open military alliances or too intimate an entanglement with the West. Non-alignment in what is considered as a predominantly Great Power struggle remains a cardinal determinant of their policy. This presents understandable difficulties for American diplomacy for the future of these nations is a critical concern of the West.

Politically, the accession of the uncommitted countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc would be a catastrophic defeat. It would almost certainly precipitate a major shift in the balance of international power. *Strategically*, they are militarily significant. For example, though the missile and nuclear age has to a great extent reduced the military importance of the Middle East as a land bridge to Africa and Southern Asia, the Western defense strategy of deterrence, which currently depends upon the preservation of an elabo-

rate network of air bases within striking distance of the Soviet Union, would be seriously impaired by its loss to communism. *Economically*, the Western world depends upon continued free access to the markets and materials of the underdeveloped world. *Ideologically*, democratic principles and procedures either have a contemporary validity for the peoples of the underdeveloped world or we must resign ourselves to a world dominated by dictators and totalitarian doctrines. American involvement with the underdeveloped world is now an accepted ingredient of policy formulation. But appreciation of the above-mentioned factors was slow in coming.

America Comes of Age

Soon after the defeat of the Axis Powers, the United States government realized that isolationism was no longer a feasible alternative. Western unity and vitality depended upon the capacity and willingness of the United States to shoulder responsibility and leadership. The nations of Western Europe, weakened by war and the dissolution of their empires, faced a bleak future. Internally, Communist parties sought to disrupt and subvert the operation of democratic institutions; while externally, Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe again placed Western security in jeopardy.

The United States reacted with imagination and vigor. It adopted the Marshall Plan in 1947 to promote Western European economic recovery and supported the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 to strengthen the West's military shield. During the 1945-1949 period, American efforts concentrated on European affairs. In 1950, with the China mainland controlled by the Communists and a war raging in Korea, an urgent program of rearmament was initiated. Preoccupied with these pressing problems, and anxious not to offend the sensitivities of its European Allies who retained measures of empire and pretensions to Great Power status, the United States endeavored to follow a "hands-off" policy in Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. But events moved too quickly.

The changes wrought by World War II in the global pattern of political relationships were nowhere more dramatically apparent than in these lands lying south of the Soviet

Union. Under the impact of war and nationalism, the colonial empires of Britain, France and the Netherlands passed into history. New nations entered the international arena, eager for status and security, and sensitive to imagined attempts at any Western restoration. At first, they viewed the United States as a champion of nationalist aspirations. America's anti-colonial heritage, however, was disregarded as the exigencies of the cold war, and the immediacy of the Soviet military threat, forced the United States to accept reluctantly some of the politically myopic colonial policies of its Allies e.g., French policy in Indochina and North Africa; Dutch policy in Indonesia; and British policy in Cyprus and Egypt. The damage to American prestige was largely unavoidable.

Soviet prestige, meanwhile, also experienced a sharp decline during the latter years of the Stalinist period. This prestige was considerable shortly after the war, particularly in underdeveloped areas where indigenous Communist parties had aligned themselves with national-liberation movements, but quickly disappeared as the rigidity of Stalin's policies became obvious. With the establishment of the Cominform in September, 1947, Moscow instituted a more openly revolutionary strategy which ended the cooperation between Communist and nationalist parties in underdeveloped countries. Attempted revolts by Communist parties in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and Malaya were suppressed, and Communist prestige plummeted there to insignificant levels. Communist parties did not emerge again as important political forces in these countries until after the death of Stalin. His preoccupation with the problems of reconstruction and economic recovery, the consolidation of empire in Eastern Europe, and the new power relationships occasioned by the unexpected emergence of the Chinese Communists also accounted for the relatively subordinate position which the underdeveloped world held in the Kremlin's hierarchy of priorities.

By 1949, the United States began to direct its attention to the underdeveloped world. In his inaugural address, President Harry S. Truman proposed that America share its knowledge and skills with the rest of the world. His "Point Four" proposal was

followed shortly thereafter by the establishment of formal programs of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. Designed to promote their economic development through technical assistance and limited grants of goods and materials, the Point Four program encourages nations to help themselves, thereby nurturing the intangibles of indigenous self-confidence and discipline. Point Four is more than a mere program of economic help. It is above all a symbol. It represents an attitude, an approach to seemingly insurmountable problems which links the West with the underdeveloped countries in a common quest for security and well-being.

Striking at the root of all that ails Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia, economically feasible and politically acceptable as a medium of external aid, Point Four typifies the essence of the American answer to the specious appeals of communism. Unfortunately, it has not been pushed consistently and vigorously enough. Indeed, since 1951, less than one-half of one per cent of America's total defense budget has gone toward Point Four operations.

American Technical Assistance

In addition to Point Four, other programs have expanded America's commitments: in 1950, the Act for International Development expanded the technical assistance activities of the United States government; in 1952, influenced by the growing military threat of the Communist world, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act, which coordinated the military, economic and technical assistance programs; in 1953, American overseas aid programs were consolidated and placed under control of the Foreign Operations Administration. This, in turn, was succeeded by the International Cooperation Administration in 1955. In addition, American loans to underdeveloped countries are extended by the Export-Import Bank, as well as through bond issues floated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Substantial quantities of surplus farm products are made available by the Department of Agriculture (in recent years, the surplus crop disposal program has exceeded a billion dollars annually).

The outbreak of the Korean war in June, 1950, accelerated the search for military security. A system of interlocking alliances was established: e.g., Nato, in 1949; Seato (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), in 1954; and the Baghdad Pact, in 1955. These pacts tended to alienate countries such as India, Burma and Egypt (which preferred to follow a policy of "neutrality") and led to a heavy emphasis on military aid. The foreign aid programs assumed a more expedient and military character. Concomitantly, economic development and technical assistance allocations acquired a marginal significance.

This pattern of apportionment continues, in large measure, to dominate the present American aid program. Of late, more attention has been devoted to economic aid. At present, approximately 40 per cent of foreign aid expenditures fall into this category. But this apportionment of funds is not nearly so impressive as might appear from a first glance because, of the amount available for economic assistance, an insignificant proportion goes to aid the politically critical uncommitted countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia.

A brief look at President Eisenhower's budgetary request for the operation of the Mutual Security Program for fiscal 1960 may be useful in illuminating the magnitude and orientation of United States efforts. The President recommended new obligational authority for \$3.93 billion. Of this, \$2.4 billion, or nearly 60 per cent of the requested amount, would be devoted to direct military assistance and defense support aid. Of the remainder, \$700 million was requested for the Development Loan Fund. Established in 1957, it is designed to provide capital to underdeveloped countries "on terms more favorable than are normally available from other sources, including repayment in foreign currencies." At that time, the Administration requested \$2 billion for three years. Congress, however, pared the amount to \$300 million for the first year, and \$400 million for the second. Repeated attempts to obtain support for authority to make loans at the rate of a billion dollars a year for a minimum period of five years have failed. Despite increasingly impressive Soviet efforts, both financially and operationally, no significantly new American approach to the

problem of helping underdeveloped countries is apparent.

The Nature of the Soviet Challenge

At the Twenty-first Congress of the C.P. S.U., on January 28, 1959, Nikita Khrushchev defended the Soviet foreign economic aid program as follows:

Our country builds its relations with all states on principles of complete equality and collaboration without any conditions of a military or political nature. We are not engaged in benevolence. The Soviet Union gives aid on fair commercial principles. The socialist countries help the underdeveloped nations to create their own industry while the United States seeks to sell consumer goods which have no sale on the home market. The Seven Year Plan opens up new opportunities for economic collaboration between the Soviet Union and the industrially underdeveloped countries.

Since 1955, the Soviet Union has established itself as an antagonist to be reckoned with in the underdeveloped world. The vigor and scope of its activity is impressive. Through a massive program of aid, trade and technical assistance, and open support in the United Nations of issues deemed vital by the uncommitted countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia, the Kremlin seeks to maximize its political influence, alienate the underdeveloped world from the West, and facilitate the coveted communization of these areas.

The Soviet diplomatic offensive rolled powerfully into gear in 1955: in February, an agreement was signed with the Indian Government under which the Soviet Union agreed to construct and help finance a one million ton steel mill in the Bhilai region of central India; in September, the U.S.S.R. dramatically re-entered the mainstream of Middle Eastern politics by its sale of arms to Egypt; and in November and December, in a display of astute political salesmanship, Khrushchev and Bulganin toured South Asia, a visit which earned much good-will for the Soviet Union. Since then, Soviet leaders have been alert to their opportunities in Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria. They have skillfully combined offers of economic and military assistance with expanded trade, technical assistance missions and cultural exchanges.

Economic aspects have received the most attention. Between 1954 and 1958, the Sino-Soviet bloc extended grants and credits to underdeveloped countries totalling \$2.5 billion. The Soviet Union provided \$1.6 billion with the balance coming from the satellites and Communist China. More than half of the amount thus far delivered has been in the form of military assistance to the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Indonesia and Afghanistan. In addition, these countries, plus India, Burma and Ceylon, have received the bulk of the economic aid. More than 4,000 technicians have been sent and Moscow has indicated a willingness to expand this phase of Soviet activity to meet the requests of the underdeveloped countries. At the International Conference on Public Education, held in Geneva in July, 1959, the Soviet representative, P. I. Polukhin, of the Soviet Ministry for Higher and Special Education declared that "We have enough scientific and technical staff for our present and foreseeable future demands. In fact we have them to spare and could lend specialists to underdeveloped countries that request our aid."¹

Although comparable United States figures are much greater, the Russians concentrate their efforts on key target areas. For example, India has received almost \$400 million in Soviet bloc economic assistance. Having found Soviet products and technical aid to be generally satisfactory, it is agreeable to a further expansion of trade. Politically, the returns for Moscow have grown commensurately. Not only do the Soviets repeatedly assert that the Western "imperialists" seek to use loans and grants to re-establish their control over India, but they maintain that the willingness of the Soviet Union to provide investment capital for the underdeveloped countries has compelled the Western nations to extend aid on more favorable terms.

Whenever possible, economic and military assistance is buttressed by political support. Thus, the Suez crisis of 1956 enabled the Kremlin to pose as the savior of Egyptian independence; the Iraqi revolution of July, 1958, received immediate diplomatic and economic support from Moscow; and India's claims in Kashmir are strongly supported in the United Nations. However, the Soviet record is not one of unqualified success. Re-

¹ *The New York Times*, July 16, 1959.

lations with Egypt have cooled in recent months, and Iraqi nationalism may not prove susceptible to Communist manipulation. Burma's mixed trade experience with the U.S.S.R. has led it to adopt less uncritical attitudes toward the Communist bloc. But these are modest exceptions. The Soviet Union, aided by subservient, indigenous Communist parties, represents a continuing threat to these areas. It will persist in its efforts to spread Soviet power and subvert Western influence. To accomplish these objectives, Soviet leaders may be expected to expand economic and trade activities, court the increasingly anti-Western intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries with meaningful programs for social and technological development, and exploit political differences within these countries and between them and the nations of the West.

Meeting the Challenge

The Soviets have chosen as their battleground the spheres of economics and ideas. In offering assistance to the underdeveloped countries, they seem guided by two major objectives: first, to convince them of the peaceful character of Soviet intentions, thereby encouraging their present "neutralist" orientation (the experience of these countries with Western imperialism accrues to the Soviet advantage since Soviet imperialism has barely impinged upon their consciousness); second, to convince them that it has more to offer than the West for their transition to a modern, industrialized society. Thus the Kremlin discredits the excessively military approach of the United States to the problems of the Middle East and Southern Asia, and emphasizes, by contrast, the economic and cultural orientation of the U.S.S.R. Communist brotherhood and Socialist solidarity are appealing themes heard every day in these areas of the world. The pro-Socialist attitudes of many intellectuals there make it easier for them to find a common ideological basis with the Communists. Both groups purport to find in Marxism a "certainty" in history and a basis for hope that man can remake his environment.

On the other hand, the West does not speak politically with such forceful uniformity or meaning. Its voices are many, too often discordant and meaningless in terms of the

needs and traditions of these societies. It cannot manufacture facile formulas for institutional and psychopolitical progress for none exist. But its response can be more vigorous and intelligent and understanding than it is at present.

Several random, though relevant, concluding remarks may be appropriate. First, anti-communism is not a suitable basis for an effective policy in the underdeveloped world. The granting of foreign aid according to a nation's overt commitment to the Western alliance system cannot in itself guarantee respect or dependable allies for the United States. Among the uncommitted countries, nationalism is not synonymous with communism. An approach even partially predicated upon such an assumption will run counter to the mood prevailing in these areas.

Second, American policy tends too often to be equated with the maintenance of the *status quo*. The preoccupation with the prevention of "aggression" and the "evils" of communism, while certainly legitimate concerns, will not result in an effective approach to the complex character of international tensions. The Kremlin is seeking the leadership of the underdeveloped world through essentially non-military means. For the United States to compete with success, many over-simplified attitudes will have to be shed.

Third, the mushrooming network of United States government agencies engaged in economic and technical assistance programs encourages confusion, inefficiency and bureaucratic jealousies. Better coordination is required to maximize the effectiveness of foreign aid. It has been suggested that a single agency be established to administer all programs of foreign economic aid. The most recent group to make this recommendation was the Draper Committee on Foreign Aid (formally known as The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program). This proposal merits further study. Another proposal, originally put forth by Senator Monroney and currently being considered by Congress, calls for the establishment of an International Development Association. This agency would be affiliated with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and have the authority to make loans to underdeveloped countries for projects not likely to

show a profit but deemed necessary for economic development.

Fourth, the United Nations should be encouraged through adequate financial support to enter more actively into the economic development field. The bilateral approach has definite limitations. At present, the United States government is opposed to channeling substantial sums for economic development through the United Nations, largely out of a desire to avoid a situation in which the U.S.S.R. would have a major voice in international economic development. But the United States contribution could be predicated on a willingness of the Soviets to match the amount.

Fifth, the West must be better prepared to take advantage of Sino-Soviet weaknesses. For example, Peking's suppressive action in Tibet, the increasingly apparent Communist use of trade as a political weapon in Southern Asia, and the subversive activities of indigenous Communist parties in Iraq, Indonesia and Burma, are having an effect in these areas. They are making the non-Communist nationalist leaders wary of too intimate an involvement with the Soviet bloc. Concomitantly, these leaders are growing

more receptive to American aid. Thus, Burma recently announced its readiness to accept up to \$37 million in assistance from the United States in the next four years.

Finally, the West must understand (and act accordingly) that the underdeveloped countries do not wish to be mere pawns in the global struggle between two competing civilizations, Western and Communist. They have a dynamic of their own which will only partially be affected by the impact of American or Soviet aid. This individuality and independence of approach must be encouraged. The United States cannot determine the outcome, but it can lend encouragement and assistance while there is still time to those interested in non-totalitarian solutions to the economic, political and social challenges facing the underdeveloped countries. Only they can make the basic decisions. But the United States can perform a valuable service by its aid and by its willingness to remain unobtrusive with its implied promise of military support if the occasion demands. Furthermore, to be effective, aid must be extended as a matter of conviction and in accordance with the objective needs of the recipients, and not the magnitude of Soviet offers.

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The patterns of confrontation and moral crusade which have characterized U.N. activities in the cold war rivalry have tended to identify the organization as an instrument of national policy, with its virtues and shortcomings largely measured in terms of its effectiveness in the Great Power struggle. Western domination tended to maneuver the United Nations into the role of universal validator, legitimizing and freezing policy in terms of principle. Consequent rigidity has emphasized the cleavage between East and West, leaving some to wonder whether the United Nations has contributed more to the building of international tensions than to their reduction. While there is something to be said for such arguments, there is perhaps more to be said for the contribution made by the United Nations in clarifying why these tensions persist.

Since 1955, however, a new factor has been added. From a membership of 60 states in the 1950-1955 period, the United Nations has grown to 82. What this has

meant is in part suggested by comparing the first vote on the Chinese representation issue, which was in 1950, with that registered eight years later. The 1950 vote was 42-8-6. In 1958, the same question with essentially the same postponement formula provided the same results, but by a vote of 42-28-11. In the interval, the United Nations has emerged from the polarities of cold war rivalry in a Western-dominated organization to the diffusion of differing rivalries in an organization no longer dominated by the West.

This has not meant that cold war issues have retreated from the scene, or even that Western-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly on cold war problems have as yet been much imperiled by the threat of defeat. It has meant, however, that impressive majorities are harder to come by, that other rivalries can compete in the General Assembly, and that American policy, and the American public, must increasingly respond to issues presented in the United Nations not central to their preoccupation with the cold war.

Current Documents

CLOSING COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

On August 5, 1959, after 65 days of talks, the foreign ministers meeting in Geneva adjourned, failing to reach agreement on the questions of Berlin's status and a German peace treaty. The official text follows:

The Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to Aug. 5, 1959.

The conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

The positions of the participants in the conference were set out on these questions.

A frank and comprehensive discussion took place on the Berlin question.

The positions of both sides on certain points became closer.

The discussions which have taken place

will be useful for the further negotiations which are necessary in order to reach an agreement.

Furthermore, the conference provided the opportunity for useful exchanges of views on other questions of mutual interest.

The foreign ministers have agreed to report the results of the conference to their respective governments.

The date and place for the resumption of the work of the conference will be settled through diplomatic channels.

THE WESTERN PACKAGE PLAN FOR A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

At the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting in May, 1959, the United States, the United Kingdom and France met with the U.S.S.R. to discuss the Soviet proposal of November 27, 1958, for a demilitarized free city of Berlin. On May 14, 1959, the three Western foreign ministers presented their package plan for a reunited Berlin and an East-West German settlement. Later, on May 19, the three Western powers and West Germany outlined 10 principles which a German settlement must include. The texts of these two documents are reprinted below in full:*

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are convinced of the urgent need for a settlement of the German problem. They desire to seek, in such a settlement, progressive solutions which would bring about German reunification and security in Europe. Moreover they believe that progress on each of the problems of general disarmament, European security and a political settlement in Europe affects the degree of progress possible in the solution of each of the other problems.

They accordingly propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an agreement between the Four Governments which would include the measures outlined below relating to a general settlement of the problems at issue. The measures envisaged are closely interrelated and the present proposals are therefore to be regarded as an inseparable whole. They would come into effect progressively at the stages indicated.

STAGE I

Reunification

1. The Four Powers would establish

* For the text of this document, see *Current History*, February, 1959, p. 107 ff.

suitable arrangements for consultation among the parties to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to settle any disputes which might arise before the conclusion of a peace settlement with a reunified Germany.

2. With regard to Berlin, the Four Powers would agree that:

- (a) Berlin is one city and belongs to all of Germany. East and West Berlin should, therefore, be united through free elections held under quadripartite or United Nations supervision. A freely elected Council would be formed for the whole of Berlin until German reunification was achieved and as a first step towards it. Thus Berlin would be retained as the future capital of a reunited Germany.
- (b) Subject to the supreme authority of the Four Powers, (with voting procedures as adopted by the Allied authorities in Vienna) the freely elected Berlin Council would be free to administer the city.
- (c) The freedom and integrity of the united city of Berlin and access thereto would be guaranteed by the Four Powers who would continue to be entitled as at present to station troops in Berlin.
- (d) The Four Powers would take the necessary steps to carry out during Stages I and II of the "Phased Plan" the measures described in (a) to (c) above.

Security

3. In a common declaration, with which other interested European states would be invited to associate themselves, they would undertake to:

- (a) settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which they may be involved with any other party;
- (b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (c) withhold assistance, military or economic, to an aggressor.

4. In order to facilitate further the solution of political problems and the improvement of international relations, the Four Powers would, in an appropriate forum, initiate discussion of possible staged and controlled comprehensive disarmament measures.

5. The Four Powers would arrange discussions to develop procedures for exchanging information in Stage II on military forces in agreed areas of Europe.

STAGE II

Reunification

6. Bearing in mind the complex issues involved in reunification, a transitional period would be agreed. The Four Powers would set up a Mixed German Committee.

7. The Mixed Committee would consist of 25 members from the Federal Republic of Germany and 10 members from the so-called "German Democratic Republic". These members would be appointed by the Federal Government and the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic respectively.

8. The Mixed Committee would take its decisions by a three quarter majority.

9. The Mixed Committee would be entrusted with the task of formulating proposals:

- (a) to coordinate and expand technical contact between the two parts of Germany;
- (b) to ensure the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany;
- (c) to ensure and guarantee human rights in both parts of Germany;
- (d) for a draft law providing for general, free and secret elections under independent supervision.

10. The Mixed Committee would transmit any proposals made by it under subparagraphs (a) to (c) inclusive of paragraph 9 above to the appropriate authorities in both parts of Germany. Such proposals, if no objections are raised with respect to them, should be implemented as appropriate in both parts of Germany.

11. (a) Any agreed proposal for an electoral law in accordance with subparagraph (d) of paragraph

9 above would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany.

- (b) If within one year no such draft law had been formulated by the Committee, the group of members from the Federal Republic on the one hand and the group of members from the so-called German Democratic Republic on the other would each formulate a draft law approved by a majority of its members. These two draft laws would then be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. The electoral area for each draft law would consist of both parts of Germany.
- (c) If any proposal for an electoral law obtained a majority of valid votes in each of the two parts of Germany, it would acquire the force of law and be directly applicable for the entire electoral area.
- (d) The Four Powers would, at the time of signature of the agreement, expressly authorize the competent German authorities to promulgate any electoral law so approved.
- (e) The Four Powers would adopt a statute providing for the supervision of the plebiscite.

12. If all-German elections had not been held on or before the termination of a thirty months' period beginning on the date of the signing of the agreement, the Four Powers would determine the disposition to be made of the Committee.

Security

13. An exchange of information on military forces in the areas referred to in paragraph 5 above would be undertaken.

14. The Four Powers would restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits, for example, [the] United States 2,500,000, [the] Soviet Union 2,500,000. During this same period, these states would place in storage depots, within their own territories and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments

to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

15. The Four Powers would be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments to become effective in Stage III subject to:

- (a) verification of compliance with the provisions of paragraph 14 above;
- (b) agreement by other essential states to accept limits on their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits of the armed forces and armaments of the Four Powers;
- (c) installation of an inspection and control system to verify compliance with all agreed security measures.

16. Measures of inspection and observation against surprise attack, helped by such technical devices as overlapping radar systems, could be undertaken in such geographical areas throughout the world as may be agreed by the Four Powers and other states concerned.

17. Since in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the Four Powers will take such arrangements as might be appropriate to secure similar measures of renunciation in the remainder of Germany and in other European countries to the East.

18. Inspection systems would be worked out for ensuring compliance with the appropriate security measures envisaged in Stage III.

STAGE III

Reunification

19. Not later than two and a half years after the signature of the agreement, elections for an all-German Assembly would be held in both parts of Germany under the terms of the electoral law drafted by the mixed Committee, approved by the Four Powers and adopted by the German people in a plebiscite (in accordance with the provisions in Stage II above).

20. The elections would be supervised by a supervisory commission and supervisory teams throughout all of Germany. The commission and teams would be composed of

either (a) United Nations Personnel and representatives of both parts of Germany, or (b) representatives of the Four Powers and representatives of both parts of Germany.

21. The all-German Assembly would have the task of drafting an all-German constitution. It would exercise such powers as are necessary to establish and secure a liberal, democratic and federative system.

22. As soon as an all German government has been formed on the basis of the above mentioned constitution it would replace the governments of the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic and would have:

- (a) full freedom of decision in regard to internal and external affairs, subject to the rights retained by the Four Powers as stipulated in paragraph 23 below;
- (b) responsibility for negotiating, as soon as possible after its establishment, an all-German Peace Treaty.

23. Pending the signature of a Peace Treaty with an all-German government formed on the basis of the all-German constitution, the Four Powers would retain only those of their rights and responsibilities which relate to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including reunification and a peace settlement and, as now exercised, to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security.

Security

24. Implementation of the following security provisions would be dependent upon the establishment of effective control and inspection systems to assure verification and upon the agreement, where appropriate, of the all-German government to the security measures called for in Stage III.

25. Upon the establishment of an all-German government, the Four Powers and such other countries as are directly concerned would agree that in a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on either side of a line to be mutually determined, agreed ceilings for the indigenous and non-indigenous forces would be put into effect.

26. After conclusion of the peace treaty,

no party would station forces in any country in this area without the consent of the country involved. Upon the request of the country involved, any party so stationing forces would withdraw them within a stated period and would undertake the obligation not to send forces to that country again without the consent of the Government of that country.

27. Should the all-German government decide to adhere to any security pact:

- (a) there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations in the area which lies closest to the frontiers between a reunited Germany and countries which are members of another security pact;
- (b) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements in additional mutual obligations, covering especially the obligation to react against aggressions;
- (c) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements herein described in giving an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of demarcation between the two parts of Germany.

28. Providing that the limitations and conditions set forth on armed forces and armaments in Stage II are met, the Four Powers would further limit their armed forces together with corresponding reduction on armaments to agreed maximum levels, for example, [the] U.S. 2,100,000; and [the] U.S.S.R. 2,100,000. Reductions in the armed forces and armaments of other essential states to agreed levels would take place at the same time in accordance with paragraph 15 of Stage II.

29. After verified compliance with the above limitations, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations would be undertaken on further limitations (for example, [the] United States 1,700,000; and the U.S.S.R. 1,700,000) together with corresponding reductions on armaments. The levels of armed forces and armaments of other essential states

would be specified at the same time through negotiations with them.

30. The measures provided for above would be harmonized with general disarmament plans so as to be included in a general framework.

31. All of the security measures of the "Phased Plan" would continue in force as long as the control system is operative and effective and the security provisions are being fulfilled and observed.

STAGE IV

Since a final Peace Settlement can only be concluded with a Government representing all Germany, it should be concluded at this stage. The Settlement should be open to signature by all states members of the United Nations which were at war with Germany. The Settlement should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

THE WESTERN PRINCIPLES FOR A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

1

The peace settlement should be freely negotiated with, and signed by, an all-German government.

2

Preliminary negotiations respecting the peace settlement should be carried on by the four powers and an all-German government.

3

Arrangements should be made for seeking agreement to the settlement, through a conference or otherwise, on the part of all other states, members of the United Nations, which were at war with Germany.

The settlement should come into force when ratified by the four powers and by Germany.

The boundaries of Germany should be determined in the settlement.

4

The settlement should recognize German sovereignty over all of the territory within the boundaries so determined.

5

The signatories should pledge themselves to respect Germany's territorial integrity and sovereignty, including the right of Germany to choose freely its own form of government.

6

The peace settlement should include provisions on the protection of basic human rights in Germany.

7

Security provisions should be such as those proposed in the Phased Plan for German Reunification and European Security.

8

Germany should recognize the validity of the treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Italy, Japan and Finland and accept the provisions of the Austrian state treaty.

9

The signatories should agree to support Germany for United Nations membership.

Pending admission to the United Nations, Germany should agree to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The signatories should recognize that Germany possesses the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter.

10

Germany should be free to decide which political and military agreements of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic it wishes to terminate.

The settlement should contain provisions to insure that as many agreements of other types be kept in force as feasible.

Received At Our Desk

WARTIME ORIGINS OF THE EAST-WEST DILEMMA OVER GERMANY.

By JOHN L. SNELL. (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1959. 268 pages, bibliographical comments and index, \$7.00.)

The Berlin crisis has once again dramatically focused attention on the problem of Germany. In a sense, it is *the* European problem. Professor Snell, a historian at Tulane University, has written a thoroughly documented, interesting study of the origins of the postwar dilemma over Germany. Utilizing the memoirs and papers of Western leaders, and the still unpublished *Potsdam Papers* of the Department of State, he attempts to show the differences of approach which beset the Big Three of World War II concerning the future of Germany.

Mr. Snell develops "The Policy of Postponement" which characterized the militarily uncertain period of 1941-1943, presents the various plans proposed for controlling Germany, including the Morgenthau Plan, and analyzes the factors leading to a less vengeful policy. An excellent chapter on the Berlin question is also included. The author expects an "indefinite prolongation of the dismemberment of the German nation and the continued absorption of the German people into Eastern and Western supranational associations." Although permanent partition was abandoned in principle by the allies in 1945, it seems the most likely prospect for the future.

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CRISIS DIPLOMACY: A History of U.S.

Intervention Policies and Practices. By D. A. GRABER. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. 402 pages, and index, \$6.75.)

In his introduction, Dr. Hans Morgenthau writes that "the present study has set itself the task to disentangle the theory and

practice of non-intervention from each other and to confront one with the other throughout different periods of American history." This the author has done with clarity.

Her approach is essentially chronological. "The first period comprises events from the beginning of the republic in 1789 to the close of the Mexican war in 1848. A second period includes events from the Mexican war to the conclusion of the Spanish-American war. The third carries from the end of the century to the beginning of World War II in 1939. A fourth period brings the story up to 1958." A.Z.R.

THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE AND THE COLD WAR. BY EDGAR MCINNIS.

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. 163 pages, \$4.50.)

This book, written by the President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, is primarily concerned with certain aspects of Anglo-American-Canadian relations. In a series of six excellent essays, the author analyzes the economic, military and political problems facing the Atlantic community, and the differences in approach which complicate relations among the three major English speaking countries. Noting the unscrupulous character of Soviet diplomacy, he writes that "the time is overdue for the western democracies to find effective ways of adapting . . . traditional diplomatic methods to the needs of the new situation. . . ."

The answer to the Soviet challenge can, he feels, be found in a strengthening of the Atlantic community. Britain, Canada and the United States have a vital role to play in this respect. "Acting in concert, they can provide both a focus and an impetus for unity of effort on the part of their associates in Western Europe; acting with other Commonwealth members, they can reach out hands of friendship to African and Asian countries through a type of association that is unparalleled in the world today."

A.Z.R.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arab States

Aug. 13—Meeting at Bhamdun, the Arab League recommends reinforcing the economic blockade of Israel.

Aug. 18—After 10 days of discussion, nine Arab states unanimously reject U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's plan for economic aid to Palestinian refugees.

Baghdad Pact

(Central Treaty Organization)

Aug. 18—It is reported in Iran that the name of the Baghdad Pact is now the Central Treaty Organization, because Baghdad has left the Pact. Members are Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

Berlin Crisis

Aug. 5—The Big Four foreign ministers meeting in Geneva adjourns after 65 days of talks fail to produce any agreement on a Berlin or German settlement. No date for resumption of the conference is set. A communiqué issued by the Four Powers describes the talks as "useful."

Conference of African States

Aug. 4—At the opening of the conference of 9 African independent states, President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia addresses the group, urging that France and Algeria negotiate a settlement. The Algerian Provisional Government (at whose request the conference was called) delegation is accorded equal status with the other delegations. (See also *French Overseas Community, Algeria.*)

Aug. 8—The Conference of independent African states ends its meetings. The conferees urge world recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government.

Disarmament

Aug. 10—It is reported from the U.N. that at the Big Four foreign ministers conference on Berlin, the Big Four agreed to set up a new 10-nation council on disarmament, working outside the U.N. and made up of the following nations: the U.S., Britain, France, Canada, and Italy—for the West—and the U.S.S.R., Czechoslo-

vakia, Poland, Rumania and Albania—for the *Communists*.

In a letter made public today, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev says that Russia would "accept the most solemn obligation" not to begin nuclear weapons testing.

Aug. 13—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld notes that "ultimate responsibility" for disarmament agreement rests in the U.N.

Aug. 20—An agreement is reached by the U.S., Great Britain and Russia to stop the discussion of a nuclear test ban until after Khrushchev talks to President Eisenhower in Washington.

Aug. 26—The U.S. reveals that it will not resume nuclear weapons testing in 1959, because of the recess in the conference on nuclear test bans.

Aug. 27—A British Foreign Office spokesman says that Britain will maintain the nuclear weapons test ban as long as the conference on nuclear weapons suspension may work out.

Aug. 28—Responding to the U.S. and British statements pledging to maintain the test ban, the U.S.S.R. says it will not renew nuclear testing so long as the Western powers do not start testing again; the U.S.S.R. also cites its willingness to sign a nuclear weapons test ban treaty.

Aug. 30—German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer asks Khrushchev to reopen talks on controlled disarmament.

Organization of American States

(See also *Haiti.*)

Aug. 12—At the opening session of the Western Hemisphere foreign ministers' conference, nonintervention is stressed. Christian Herter, U.S. Secretary of State, is present.

Aug. 16—The Inter-American Peace Commission formed in 1940 is assigned responsibility for trying to alleviate tensions in the Caribbean area by conciliation and on-the-spot negotiation. U.S. Ambassador John C. Dreier is chairman. The Commission can act on its own initiative or on request of any government. The affected

country must consent before investigation begins.

Aug. 18—The Declaration of Santiago is signed by the 21 foreign ministers: invasions by rebels, and the maintenance of antidemocratic regimes are condemned. It is agreed that the O.A.S. should have some power to deal with rebel invasions.

United Nations

Aug. 12—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld reports "deep concern" at the financial condition of the U.N. because some members have not paid their assessments.

Aug. 15—A U.N. survey reveals that in 71 states women have equal rights with men to vote and be elected to office; in 10 countries they have no voting rights.

Aug. 24—Dag Hammarskjöld arrives in Buenos Aires in his first visit to South America as U.N. Secretary General.

Aug. 30—Tibet's Dalai Lama asks the U.N. for help against Chinese aggression (see also *Tibet*).

ARGENTINA

Aug. 11—A 24-hour general strike, the fifth this year, is called by Peronist unions. The strike is called in support of striking sugar workers in Tucuman.

Aug. 13—Almost 100,000 sugar workers end their strike, after receiving a 70 per cent pay increase.

Aug. 25—Some 7000 plants stop operations because 750,000 metalworkers go on strike.

BRAZIL

Aug. 1—Horace Lafer is appointed foreign minister, succeeding Francisco Negrao de Lima.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

Aug. 5—The Government reduces income taxes 5 per cent across the board; social security pensions are increased. The total budget for fiscal 1960 is £1,682,000,000 (\$3,767,680,000).

A joint statement from the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State welcomes Australia's elimination of most discriminatory restrictions on dollar imports and the enlarging of import quotas.

Canada

Aug. 1—Queen Elizabeth II approves the appointment of Major General George Philias Vanier as Canada's Governor

General, succeeding the retiring Vincent Massey.

Aug. 20—Newfoundland's Premier Joseph Smallwood is returned to office as the Liberal party takes 31 assembly seats in the provincial election; the Conservatives win 3 seats and the new United Newfoundland party wins 2 seats.

Ceylon

Aug. 5—Six Russian technicians arrive in Colombo to help with a 100,000,000 rupee (\$23 million) iron and steel rolling project. The U.S.S.R. is also providing a long-term loan of 120,000,000 rubles (some \$30 million).

Ghana

Aug. 12—Queen Elizabeth II names Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah to the royal Privy Council. Nkrumah is visiting the Queen at Balmoral Castle, Scotland.

Aug. 17—The United (opposition) party chooses S. D. Dombo as parliamentary leader, replacing Kofi Busia.

Aug. 27—It is announced in the Netherlands that Kofi Busia has abandoned politics and has accepted a 3-year appointment as professor of sociology at the International Institute of Social Studies at The Hague.

Great Britain (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Aug. 2—The Queen returns to London after her 6-week Canadian tour.

Aug. 7—It is revealed in London that the Queen is expecting her third child in early 1960.

The Government protests to the Maldivian government because of violence in an attack against inhabitants of Huvadhu atoll. (See also *British Empire, Maldivian Islands*.)

Aug. 15—The Street Offenses Act of 1959 against vice goes into effect.

Aug. 20—Minister of State John D. Profumo talks with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman about the Sultan's request for military assistance.

Aug. 21—The *Manchester Guardian* announces that it is deleting the word "Manchester" from its title, effective August 24. The *Manchester Guardian* weekly's title will not be changed.

A survey reveals that 3 newspapers and 8 other publications have suspended publication or merged with other publications because of the 7-week printing strike.

It is reported from London that British

scientists have developed an efficient fuel cell producing electricity from a chemical reaction.

Aug. 27—Britain becomes the first of 14 signatories to ratify the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention.

Aug. 28—The Board of Trade reveals that Britain and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to trade consumer goods worth some £3.4 million (\$9.5 million) during fiscal 1960.

India

Aug. 1—The new Swatantra party at its first convention promises to oppose the Congress party because it is "taking this country toward Sovietism. . . ."

Aug. 13—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru says he has protested the Communist Chinese propaganda describing India as "imperialist."

Aug. 25—Nehru says India will defend the Himalayan states of Bhutan and Sikkim; it is reported that they fear Communist attack.

Aug. 28—Prime Minister Nehru charges that Communist China has invaded India at two points opposite Tibet in recent weeks and tells Parliament that India will "defend our country's borders and integrity."

Aug. 29—It is reported from New Delhi that troops are on the way to man India's borders separating India from Tibet.

Aug. 30—The Communist party of India expresses "fervent hope" that India and China can settle their difficulties by discussion.

Aug. 31—Reports from Darjeeling charge that almost 400 Chinese Communists have advanced several square miles into Bhutan. Chinese troops are also reported in Sikkim and the North East Frontier Agency.

Malaya

Aug. 19—The Alliance party is reported to have won at least 70 of the 104 seats in today's general elections for the Legislative Assembly.

Aug. 21—Tengku (Prince) Abdul Rahman becomes Prime Minister of Malaya; his party now holds 73 seats in the Malayan legislature.

Union of South Africa

Aug. 10—An opening statement from the prosecution in the trial against 30 accused traitors (arrested in 1956) charges them

with involvement in a Communist conspiracy.

Aug. 18—Increased taxes and restrictive legislation causes continuing violence from African women; disorder is now in its fifth day.

Aug. 29—The African National Congress cancels the protest boycott on potatoes after 3 months.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Basutoland

Aug. 22—Britain agrees to increase Basutoland powers in a National Council and an Executive Council.

Cyprus

Aug. 11—Leaflets are distributed publicizing the establishment of a new secret group determined on *enosis* (union with Greece) "by force if need be."

Aug. 15—Archbishop Makarios criticizes the renewed drive for *enosis*.

Aug. 19—Governor Sir Hugh Foot refuses to allow the Left-wing A.K.E.L. to hold a congress in Nicosia late in August. The party has been banned since December, 1955.

Aug. 25—Makarios calls a special session of the Greek Cypriote Consultative Assembly because of the deadlock on constitutional issues between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Aug. 15—Prime Minister Roy Welensky of the Federation states his views on an independent Nyasaland; he fears it would become a Communist pawn.

Aug. 24—African representation in the Legislative Council is to be increased from 5 to 7 members, according to a government statement.

Jamaica

Aug. 14—Premier Norman W. Manley's Government takes office.

Aug. 15—Manley says he plans no new or radical policies. Cabinet changes are announced.

Kenya

Aug. 5—Nationalist Tom Mboya reveals plans to charter a place to send 81 Kenyans to study in the U.S. under scholarships he arranged during his U.S. visit.

Aug. 24—Tom Mboya leads a new party, the Kenya Independence Movement, with stronger demands for African participa-

tion than those endorsed by the Nationalist party.

Maldives Islands (See also

British Commonwealth, Great Britain.)

Aug. 14—The Government protests British troop landings on Gan.

Aug. 15—A British Air Force spokesman says the troops were landed as "an air mobility exercise" and will be recalled shortly.

Aug. 17—An army spokesman says the 100 British troops who were airlifted from Singapore have been withdrawn from the Maldives Islands.

The British government is notified that Maldives Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir will not go to London to work out an agreement on British construction of an air base in the Islands.

Nigeria

Aug. 23—A joint trade union conference between Nigeria and Ghana agrees on a West African Federation of Trade Unions.

BULGARIA

Aug. 3—It is revealed that Greece has refused to agree to a 20-year non-aggression pact with Bulgaria.

CAMBODIA

Aug. 3—Premier Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia arrives in South Vietnam for talks with President Ngo Dinh Diem.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

Aug. 16—According to a newly released report by the U.S. National Planning Association (prepared by A. Doak Barnett), Communist Chinese aid to Southeast Asia during the First Five Year Plan reached \$647 million, most of which was in grants rather than loans. The report states that such economic handouts are "particularly striking" in view of small Soviet loans to Red China.

Aug. 17—The Chinese Communists shell the Nationalist offshore islands.

Aug. 27—A communiqué by the Communist party Central Committee is broadcast today in which it is revealed that "total output" figures for 1958 production were inflated. Goals for 1959 have been cut.

Aug. 28—An address by Premier Chou En-lai before an "enlarged session" of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress last week, in which he detailed industrial production figures for the first half of 1959, is reported: all 1959

figures were above 1958 levels, in most instances by more than 20 per cent.

COLOMBIA

Aug. 15—An emergency Cabinet session is held after clashes yesterday between government troops and striking sugar workers. Following the clash, "the provincial labor confederation" called a general strike.

COSTA RICA

Aug. 18—Costa Rican patrol groups fight with rebels near the Nicaraguan frontier as part of the government's drive to clean out rebels from the border area.

CUBA

Aug. 9—The Cuban army is placed on alert following an attack on the home of Premier Fidel Castro earlier today. Castro was not at home.

Aug. 19—*Revolución*, the official organ of Castro's revolutionary movement, confirms recent reports that an anti-government conspiracy has been halted; some 1000 are reported to have been arrested.

Aug. 12—Castro leaves for Las Villas Province to direct action against a counter-revolutionary band reportedly fighting government troops.

Aug. 14—The government announces that Cuban troops have captured a plane carrying Cuban counter-revolutionaries. The plane is reported to have come from the Dominican Republic.

Aug. 15—In a 5-hour radio-television address, Premier Castro accuses the Dominican Republic of sending counter-revolutionaries into Cuba.

Aug. 16—Major Raul Castro departs for the Chilean inter-American foreign ministers' conference.

Aug. 20—Ex-President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba arrives in his new place of exile, Portugal, from the Dominican Republic.

Aug. 22—The government seizes control of the Macagua sugar refinery, the first instance of such government interference, because the Cuban owners planned to sabotage sugar production.

DENMARK

Aug. 3—Denmark receives its first shipment of U.S. Nike rockets (minus their atomic warheads).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Aug. 9—A *New York Times* report discloses

that Puerto Ricans from New York's West Side are being sent to Cuba, where they are being trained by Cubans, Venezuelans and Dominicans as part of a revolutionary invasion force against the Dominican government.

FINLAND

Aug. 29—It is reported by the Finnish army that last March an arms agreement with the Soviet Union was completed: Finland will receive 12 tanks, a jet trainer plane and motors for torpedo boats.

FRANCE

Aug. 1—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld leaves Paris after a 2-day talk with French President Charles de Gaulle and Premier Michel Debré.

Aug. 10—French officials state that no atomic test explosions are planned "in the coming weeks."

Aug. 16—A statement by Premier Michel Debré reveals French uneasiness over the forthcoming bilateral talks between Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Debré declares that France must have a voice that can be heard among the world powers.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

Algeria

Aug. 6—Premier Michel Debré leaves for Algiers for talks on Algeria's economic development.

The French offensive against the rebel groups in the Kabylia region enters its third week.

Aug. 7—Speaking at the Conference of Nine Independent African States, the Minister of Information for the Algerian Provisional Government declares that his government will fight for "many years."

Aug. 27—President Charles de Gaulle leaves for a tour of Algeria to discuss the situation with French military leaders there.

Aug. 28—Muslim Senator Cherif Ben Habyles, who has opposed Algerian integration with France as "inadequate," is assassinated.

Aug. 29—De Gaulle, addressing a crowd of Muslims, tells them that peace must be restored; he adds that "The Algerians will make their destiny themselves."

Aug. 30—De Gaulle returns to Paris.

Cameroon

Aug. 2—A special court sentences 7 persons (five still at large) to death for terrorist activities.

Congo Republic

Aug. 2—It is reported that last night the government put down rioting by Matsouanists, members of a religious sect.

Mali, Federation of

Aug. 12—An interview yesterday with Mali President Modibo Keito is reported, in which Keito has stated that he will press for greater independence within the French Community, i.e., for control over foreign affairs.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST)

Aug. 31—Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Russian atomic spy who came to East Germany last May after serving a 9-year British prison term, is named deputy director of the central East German institute for atomic energy research.

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC (West Germany)

Aug. 7—Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano expresses his government's approval of the forthcoming talks scheduled between Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Aug. 23—German government sources reveal that Soviet Premier Khrushchev has sent a 5000-word letter to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, reiterating Soviet proposals for freeing Berlin and unifying Germany.

Aug. 29—Some 30,000 coal miners stage a protest march because overproduction of coal has caused shutdowns and unemployment in the Ruhr.

Aug. 31—Chancellor Adenauer, speaking on the eve of the Nazi invasion of Poland 20 years ago, expresses hope for better relations between Poland and "the new Germany."

GREECE

Aug. 17—It is reported that General George Grivas, opposed to the recent Cyprus settlement, addressed Greek crowds over the weekend; Grivas told audiences that he was willing to lead, if the people wanted him, in the formation of a "powerful Greece."

GUINEA

Aug. 26—The Soviet Union announces a 140 million ruble loan (\$35 million) to Guinea over a 12-year period.

HAITI

Aug. 14—It is reported that 30 armed rebels landed in Haiti yesterday.

Aug. 17—At the Chilean conference of the O.A.S., Haiti requests that the O.A.S. investigate the recent rebel invasion of Haiti launched from Cuba. (See also *International, O.A.S.*)

Aug. 20—The arrest of the highest ranking Roman Catholic official, Archbishop Francois Poirier, because he criticized the government, is ordered.

It is reported that Haitian Army troops have broken up the 30-man invasion band.

Aug. 21—The arrest of the Archbishop is suspended following a Vatican threat to excommunicate everyone connected with this step.

Aug. 24—Presidential Secretary Clement Bardot announces that the government is collecting evidence against Archbishop Poirier in order to request his recall by the Vatican.

The government charges that the rebel band which landed August 13 was composed of Cuban army soldiers.

Aug. 25—A government source reports that plans for demanding the Archbishop's recall have been dropped. It is also reported that the government expects the Archbishop to retract his anti-government criticism.

HUNGARY

Aug. 4—Josef Revai, a former vice-president and a Communist party leader for many years, dies.

Aug. 29—Hungary and Japan reopen diplomatic relations.

ICELAND

Aug. 15—President Asgeir Asgeirsson dissolves the parliament (*Althing*). Elections are scheduled for October 25 and 26.

INDONESIA

Aug. 13—It is reported that Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution has ordered the Communists to call off their sixth national party congress scheduled for August 22.

Aug. 14—It is reported that President Sukarno has appointed the Sultan of Jogja-

karta as head of a supervisory "watchdog" group that will oversee government operations. The Sultan is a firm anti-Communist.

It is announced that an agreement has been signed with the Soviet Union for \$117.5 million in Russian assistance.

Aug. 15—Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist party D. N. Aidit declares that the party congress will be held as scheduled.

Aug. 16—After meetings between Communist officials and army officers, it is announced that the Communists' congress will be postponed until next month.

Aug. 17—President Sukarno, in an address marking the fourteenth year of independence from the Dutch, declares that unless Indonesia's claim to Netherlands West New Guinea (West Irian) is recognized, all Dutch capital in Indonesia will be seized.

Aug. 24—Sukarno devalues all large bank notes by 90 per cent and freezes bank deposits over \$2,187 (25,000 rupiahs). The order goes into effect tomorrow.

Aug. 27—Jakarta banks reopen after a 2-day closing following President Sukarno's rupiah devaluation.

IRAN

Aug. 20—The sixth anniversary of the coup ousting Premier Mohammed Mossadegh is celebrated with anti-Communist demonstrations.

IRAQ

Aug. 3—In the Iraqi Communist newspaper, a self-critical report by the party's Central Committee is made public.

Aug. 5—It is announced that Prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassim has accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

Aug. 25—Five Iraqi army officers and a civilian are executed after being tried earlier this month on charges of participating in the March revolt in Mosul.

ISRAEL

Aug. 6—The Israeli Knesset (Parliament) adjourns. Elections for a new Knesset (chosen every four years) will be held November 3.

Aug. 13—Foreign Minister Golda Meir insists that Israel is entitled to free and unconditional passage through the Suez Canal. Her statement is in effect a rejection of U.N. Secretary General Dag Ham-

marksjold's compromise formula for sending Israeli cargoes through the Canal. The U.A.R. has refused transit on Israeli cargoes on foreign-owned ships.

Aug. 31—An Israeli letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council denounces the U.A.R. for refusing passage to the Danish ship, *Inge Toft*, carrying an Israeli cargo through the Suez.

ITALY

Aug. 12—The Sicilian Parliament elects Silvio Milazzo head of the administration of "this semi-autonomous island." Milazzo is the leader of "Sicilianism," or greater independence for Sicily.

JAPAN

Aug. 7—A 3-day meeting of the Fifth World Conference against A- and H-Bombs ends after adopting a "gentle" pacifist "Hiroshima Appeal."

Aug. 12—South Korea reopens diplomatic ties with Japan, broken off in the fight over the repatriation of Korean nationals in Japan to North Korea.

Aug. 13—North Korean and Japanese Red Cross delegates sign an agreement for the repatriation of Korean nationals from Japan.

JORDAN

Aug. 16—Jordan and the United Arab Republic reestablish diplomatic ties broken off last year.

Aug. 20—Former Army Chief of Staff General Udek Shareh tells a security court that he was implicated in a plot to overthrow King Hussein last March.

Aug. 26—Jordanian Premier Hazza Majali offers Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinian Arab refugees.

KOREA (SOUTH)

Aug. 15—President Syngman Rhee delivers an address, voicing hope for the eventual reunification of North and South Korea, in honor of the fourteenth year of independence from Japan and the third year of the Republic of South Korea.

LAOS (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Aug. 1—The U.S. declares that the fighting between Laotian troops and Pathet Lao rebels in Samneua and Phongsaly provinces along the North Vietnam border may be Communist-inspired.

North Vietnam declares that it will not

"remain indifferent" to fighting between rebels and Laotian troops.

Neo Lao Haksat party (a branch of the Communist-led Pathet Lao) leaders, including Prince Souphanouvong, are under arrest according to a Communist Chinese (*Hsinhua*) news agency.

Aug. 2—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, at the Geneva conference, tells Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that the rebel fighting in Laos is Communist-influenced. He asks the Soviet Union to keep North Vietnam from interfering in Laotian affairs.

Aug. 4—Premier Phoui Sananikone calls a state of emergency in 5 northeast provinces.

At the Geneva foreign ministers meeting, the 3 Western delegates discuss the Laotian situation.

Aug. 5—Laotian Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya, in a message to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, charges that North Vietnam has armed and supplied Laotian rebels.

Aug. 9—A plan whereby French and U.S. military experts will train Laotian troops beginning this month is announced.

Aug. 10—The Peking radio reports North Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister Ta Quang Bun's warning against foreign troops in Laos: Ta declares that such intervention will be considered a threat to his government.

Aug. 12—Communist China blames U.S. bases in Laos for the recent trouble (the U.S. has no bases in Laos except for the one at Seno held by Seato).

Aug. 17—The Soviet Union, in an official statement published in *Tass*, says that Laos has violated its neutrality status as provided for in the 1954 agreement ending the Indochina war by allowing a U.S. base on its soil.

Aug. 18—It is reported that the Laotian rebel offensive in Phongsaly and Samneua Provinces is being stepped up again.

Aug. 23—It is reported that rebels have entered Vientiane Province. An army post 50 miles from the capital, Vientiane, has been attacked.

Aug. 26—The U.S. State Department announces that it will send money and equipment to Laos.

According to a Laotian military report, some 4,000 rebels have been fighting army troops in Laos.

Aug. 28—Pathet Lao rebels attack an army post only 16 miles from Vientiane, the capital city.

Aug. 31—Laos receives its first shipment of U.S. supplies: 2,640 pairs of jungle boots.

MOROCCO

Aug. 2—Morocco and the U.S., it is reported, have reached agreement on a plan whereby the U.S. will give Morocco about \$1 million a month. The Moroccan government will be the "legal employer" and responsible for paying local labor employed at U.S. air bases. This is the first recognition Morocco has given U.S. bases on its soil.

Aug. 6—Morocco declares that its consenting to become the legal employer for local help on U.S. bases was not an agreement, according to a Foreign Ministry communiqué, and that the bureau set up to administer the money is "non-official."

NICARAGUA

Aug. 6—It is announced that a rebel band attempting to invade Nicaragua has been routed.

Aug. 14—President Luis A. Somoza Debayle approves a law which prohibits a president from succeeding himself.

PERU

Aug. 20—Premier Pedro G. Beltran receives a vote of confidence on his program for establishing economic stability.

POLAND

Aug. 2—Some 100,000 Poles greet U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon upon his arrival in Poland.

Aug. 3—Vice-President Nixon and Polish United Workers (Communist) party First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka discuss Polish-U.S. relations for more than 5 hours.

Aug. 4—Vice-President Nixon visits the church of Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Polish Roman Catholic Primate; the Cardinal is on vacation.

RUMANIA

Aug. 24—It is reported that Communist leaders have declared that 70 per cent of the agricultural area is now grouped into collective farms.

SPAIN

Aug. 31—Generalissimo Francisco Franco sends a message to U.S. President Eisenhower to give his support to the forthcoming meeting between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Eisenhower.

TIBET (See also *International, U.N. and British Commonwealth, India.*)

Aug. 6—Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accuses the Communist Chinese of violating the 1954 agreement for trade, travel and commerce between India and Tibet.

Aug. 18—Reports reaching Indian border towns declare that Communist China has arrested the Panchen Lama, new ruler of Tibet.

Aug. 30—In an interview with the Panchen Lama published in the Hungarian Communist newspaper, the new Tibetan leader declares that the Chinese Communists will help install socialist reforms in his country.

TUNISIA

Aug. 15—Tunisia reports that a French army plane from Algeria crossed over the border and fired twice on the Tunisian town, Bhiret Zitouna.

Aug. 20—President Habib Bourguiba announces that Tunisia has left the French customs union. A new French-Tunisian agreement will be sought and no new Tunisian tariffs will be applied to French goods until October. Tunisians will now be allowed to make purchases in the dollar market.

The French Army denies bombing Bhiret Zitouna. An army communiqué declares that the plane, pursuing rebels fleeing to Tunisia, strafed but did not bomb the town.

TURKEY

Aug. 22—Turkish newspaper stories state that a group of Turks near the border were fired on by Soviet guards two days ago.

U.S.S.R., THE

Aug. 1—In a 1-hour television and radio broadcast, U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon lauds Khrushchev's talents and urges that the Soviet leader use them to improve the condition of the Soviet people. If Khrushchev continues to push

world communism, Nixon cautions, international tension will increase. The U.S. Vice-President also proposes radio and television broadcasts from the U.S. President to the Soviet people and from Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the American people.

Aug. 3—It is announced that Premier Khrushchev has accepted an invitation from U.S. President Eisenhower to visit the U.S.

Aug. 5—In his third press conference since he became premier, Nikita Khrushchev declares that he is going to Washington to discuss peace, and will do no "saber rattling." He declares that the most difficult question he will discuss with Eisenhower will be the German issue.

Seventy of the books prohibited from the U.S. fair in Moscow are restored to the exhibit with plastic shields so they can be seen but not read.

Aug. 9—A Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a Nobel Prize-winner, Nikolai N. Semyonov, in an article in *Izvestia* is reported today to have urged the reorganization of scientific research being conducted in the Soviet Union. He has charged that Soviet scientists spend too much time on red tape.

August 10—The Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology and Culture at the New York Coliseum closes after 42 days.

Aug. 16—A plan to allow installment buying by Soviet consumers is announced. The credit system will begin next month.

Aug. 22—The U.S. White House announces that Soviet Premier Khrushchev will visit 6 U.S. cities: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines and Ames, Iowa, and Pittsburgh, as well as Washington. The U.S. permanent delegate to the U.N., Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, is appointed to accompany Khrushchev, who will arrive September 15.

Aug. 25—President Eisenhower announces that Khrushchev will visit the U.S. in the capacity of head of state.

Aug. 27—An August 19 communication sent to West Germany from Soviet Premier Khrushchev is made public by the Moscow press and radio, in which Khrushchev urges better relations between West Germany and the U.S.S.R., and an East and West German confederation. He

warns Germany against establishing Western missile bases.

Aug. 28—Sources in Washington declare that Premier Khrushchev will be accompanied by his family when he arrives in Washington next month.

Aug. 30—*Tass*, Soviet press agency, reports a speech before Soviet villagers by Premier Khrushchev in which the Soviet leader expresses hopes for peace and for "an improvement in Soviet-American relations." *Tass* also announces that Mr. Khrushchev has invited Soviet novelist Mikhail A. Sholokhov to come to the U.S. with him. *Tass* also reports that Khrushchev is pleased with West German Chancellor Adenauer's reply to his letter earlier this month: he urges Adenauer to elaborate on his proposals for disarmament.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Aug. 8—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares that he will not allow Israel to use the Suez Canal.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Aug. 2—Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat) says he will present an omnibus farm bill soon.

Aug. 5—The Agriculture Department reveals that in 1958 Americans spent \$57.7 billion for food produced by American farmers, an increase of 5 per cent over the previous year.

Aug. 8—Estimates released by the Agriculture Department show an increase in the average farm size from 570 acres in 1945 to 643 acres in 1958; less than one per cent of ownership units in 1958 were corporations, holding some 8 per cent of the acreage, with 2 per cent of the land value.

Aug. 26—The Agriculture Department reports that in the July 23 wheat referendum, 80.0 per cent of the voting farmers favored marketing quotas for the coming year.

The Economy

Aug. 11—The Department of Labor reports that in mid-July a record number—67,594,000 Americans—were employed.

Aug. 16—The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth, headed by Vice-President Richard Nixon, issues the first of a series of educational statements

and notes that inflation is no longer a grave danger.

Aug. 21—The Labor Department reports a rise in the Consumer Price Index for July for the fourth successive month.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 2—Vice-President Richard Nixon says he thinks Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev should visit the U.S.

Aug. 3—President Eisenhower says Khrushchev will visit the U.S. in September and he plans to visit the U.S.S.R. in the fall.

Aug. 5—Vice-President Nixon returns to Washington after his Russian tour.

A French-American aviation agreement is reached.

Aug. 6—Secretary of State Christian Herter returns from the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, blaming Russia for its failure.

Aug. 7—A White House statement reveals that the President will fly to London August 28.

Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller tells the U.S.S.R. to talk about "specific proposals" for increasing U.S.-Russian trade.

Aug. 9—The White House reveals that the President has changed the schedule of his European trip and will go to Bonn first.

Aug. 10—Christian Herter leaves for a special inter-American foreign ministers' conference on Caribbean tensions.

Aug. 11—The State Department makes a formal statement accusing the Communists of stirring up "a dangerous situation" in Laos.

Aug. 15—The White House announces that the President will visit Queen Elizabeth II in Scotland.

Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson reveals that the U.S. plans to urge the establishment of an International Development Association, an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to make long-term low interest loans for industrial development.

Aug. 19—The White House announces that the President and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan will be televised from London.

The State Department suggests that recent Communist military action in Laos may be due to "Soviet complicity."

Aug. 24—Secretary of State Christian Her-

ter says that the trouble in Laos looks "very dangerous."

Aug. 25—Vice-President Richard Nixon talks to the American Legion and states that the President will not acquiesce in the status of the "captive peoples" of East Europe.

Aug. 26—President Eisenhower flies from Washington to Bonn and is greeted by cheering thousands.

The State Department reveals that additional military aid is to be sent to Laos.

Aug. 27—The British Prime Minister greets Eisenhower as he arrives at London Airport.

Aug. 29—The President and Prime Minister Macmillan meet at Chequers and agree on a unified approach to East-West problems.

At Poznan, Poland, the U.S. opens its only consulate outside a capital city behind the iron curtain.

Henry E. Stebbins is named as the first U.S. Ambassador to Nepal.

Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Maria Castiella y Maiz meets Eisenhower and Herter in London to discuss defense arrangements.

Aug. 30—Richard Nixon warns that Khrushchev's visit does not indicate a thaw in Russian foreign policy.

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. W. Fulbright suggests that the U.S. should revise its Middle Eastern policies because of some "hopeful developments" in the Arab world.

Aug. 31—In a televised broadcast from London to Britain and several European countries, President Eisenhower says that a profitable summit conference must be based on Khrushchev's recognition that "peace is imperative"; he will not be a party to a summit conference that would "depress and discourage" people. British Prime Minister Macmillan speaks also, expressing his continuing desire for a summit conference.

Government

Aug. 6—Frederick H. Mueller's nomination as Secretary of Commerce is confirmed by the Senate.

President Eisenhower signs the bond financing bill for the T.V.A. after Congress promises to delete an objectionable provision.

Aug. 7—Major television networks refuse a Democratic party request for equal time

to answer Eisenhower's speech on labor legislation.

Aug. 10—Secretary of Commerce Mueller takes office.

Aug. 11—President Eisenhower names Vance Brand managing director of the Development Loan Fund.

Aug. 12—Robert D. Murphy is confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

The Senate sustains the President's housing bill veto.

Aug. 13—The House approves the Landrum-Griffin labor bill, 229-201.

Aug. 17—The President vetoes a bill to double the maximum acreage allowed for holding Alaskan oil and gas leases or options.

Aug. 18—The President signs a defense appropriation bill for \$39,228,239,000. This is 99.95 per cent of his military funds request.

Aug. 19—New Jersey Democrat Frank Thompson of the House of Representatives is showered with acid as he is driving to the Capital.

The White House reveals that the President plans to give a nation-wide radio and television speech on farm legislation before the next session of Congress.

Aug. 21—Hawaii becomes the 50th state of the Union; William F. Quinn is sworn in as Hawaii's governor.

Aug. 24—Two Senators and one Representative from Hawaii are seated in Congress: Republican Hiram L. Fong is the senior Senator; Democrat Pren E. Long is the junior Senator; Democrat Daniel K. Inouye represents Hawaii in the House.

Aug. 25—The President tells Congress there will be "very serious" results if the ceilings on interest rates for Government securities are not removed.

Aug. 27—Congress passes and sends the White House an omnibus housing bill despite the President's threat of veto. The bill calls for an expenditure of some \$1.05 billion. Both Houses passed the bill with more than the two-thirds necessary to override the President's veto.

Aug. 28—The Senate-House conference on the labor bill is deadlocked; the Senate will vote on the Landrum-Griffin bill or a compromise Senate bill shortly.

The President vetoes the civil works appropriation bill for \$1.2 billion, because the bill calls for 67 new starts in civil works at a cost of \$800 million despite the President's request that no new starts be made.

Aug. 29—Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman of the Senate-House Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, reveals that the annual federal civilian payroll has reached a record of more than \$12.3 billion.

The President signs a bill providing for revision of the pension system for war veterans with non-service connected disabilities.

Aug. 31—Senate Republicans and Southern Democrats agree on "adjustments" on points of disagreement with Democrats who support an "easier" labor bill.

A Senate floor fight on the Landrum-Griffin bill is postponed.

Labor

Aug. 2—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell declares that negotiators for the steel companies and the union have not tried to settle the steel strike.

Aug. 4—A Senate committee report sharply criticizes James Hoffa and two of his Teamsters Union aides.

Aug. 6—President Eisenhower makes a radio-television appeal for a bipartisan and effective labor reform law.

Aug. 20—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Executive Council votes to avoid contact with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev when he visits the U.S.

Aug. 21—A copper miner strike spreads to the American Smelting and Refining Company. This is the fourth large copper concern to be shut down.

The President names George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., and 4 others to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. The President has passed over Walter Reuther, who allegedly hoped for the appointment.

Aug. 22—Secretary Mitchell reports the "severe" effect of the prolonged steel strike.

Aug. 24—R. Conrad Cooper, chief negotiator for the steel industry, says that he hopes for Taft-Hartley intervention if direct collective bargaining fails to settle the steel strike.

Aug. 26—David J. McDonald, president of the Steelworkers, resumes a personal role in bargaining negotiations with the steel companies after a 3-week absence.

Aug. 31—Eleven nonoperating railroad unions ask a 25 cents an hour wage increase and some additional welfare provisions.

Military Policy

Aug. 7—The Explorer VI, a paddle-wheeled satellite, is launched into orbit from Cape Canaveral.

At a conference in Washington, the Navy reveals that a radio monitoring system known as Project Teepee is in operation and detects instantly 95 per cent of all atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and rocket launchings anywhere in the world. Location of missile launching sites and weapons evaluation are also possible.

Aug. 12—Major General David M. Shoup is chosen commandant of the Marine Corps, succeeding the retiring General Randolph McC. Pate.

Aug. 13—Discoverer V goes into polar orbit.

Aug. 14—At Cape Canaveral, a 91-foot Titan explodes on its pad.

Aug. 16—Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey dies at 76.

Aug. 19—Discoverer VI goes into orbit.

An explosion on the carrier Wasp kills 2 and injures 21 men.

Aug. 21—The Navy cancels its high speed jet seaplane program after an expenditure of \$400 million.

Aug. 22—The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy reports there is a minimal fall-out hazard from past atomic tests but warns of danger if intensive testing begins again.

Aug. 30—The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy estimates that in the event of nuclear war 50 million Americans would be killed at once; 20 million more would be seriously hurt; 50 per cent of American dwellings would be demolished or unusable for months.

Politics

Aug. 2—New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller says he will not be a candidate for the vice-presidency.

Aug. 12—Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler says the party's 1960 national convention will not be held in Los Angeles

if a disagreement over spectator seats is not settled shortly.

Aug. 18—Governor Rockefeller confers with President Eisenhower.

Segregation

Aug. 1—At Little Rock, Arkansas, a school board member reveals that 6 Negroes have been placed in high schools formerly all-white.

Aug. 12—Two mixed high schools open in Little Rock; police disperse a mob.

Aug. 15—Registration for Warren County High School at Front Royal, Virginia, reveals few white children registering to attend classes.

Aug. 16—The president of the Little Rock School Board says that Little Rock will honor a regulation providing for segregated classes when requested in integrated schools.

VENEZUELA

Aug. 4—In nine hours of clashes, Caracas mobs fight army and police troops; order is restored by nightfall.

VIETNAM (NORTH)

Aug. 21—The Peking radio announces that North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh has conferred in Peking with Red Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi.

VIETNAM (SOUTH)

Aug. 29—Elections for 123 seats in the National Assembly are held with 460 candidates competing.

YEMEN

Aug. 17—The Imam of Yemen is reported to be taking steps to rid his country of rebel elements who tried to come to power during the Imam's 4-month convalescence period abroad. The Imam returned home last week.

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 1—Figures on the Yugoslav economy for the first 6 months of 1959 show a 10 per cent increase in industrial production over 1958; exports have risen 8 per cent and imports have dropped 4 per cent.

Aug. 13—A record wheat crop is estimated by agricultural experts.

Aug. 15—Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia arrives in Yugoslavia for a 10-day visit with Marshal Tito.

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